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Property Lost in Translation
Abraham Bell† & Gideon Parchomovsky††
The world is full of localized, nonstandard property regimes that coexist
alongside state property laws. This Article provides the first comprehensive look at
the phenomenon of localized property systems and the difficulties that necessarily
attend the translation of localized property rights.
Rather than survey the numerous localized property systems in the world,
this Article explores the common features of the interaction between localized and
state property systems. All localized property systems entail translation costs with
the wider state property systems around them. Translation costs result from incompatibilities, as well as information and enforcement costs. Focusing on translation costs, the Article examines the pressures for localized systems to converge into
larger state systems, as well as the features of localized property that may keep it
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distinct. Additionally, it shows that state protection of localized property systems
(such as Norwegian protection of the property rights of the indigenous Sámi people) may sometimes lower translation costs but may also lower the utility of the localized systems through poor incorporation into state law.
Understanding localized property systems has important implications for
understanding the nature of property. Property law systems, like other legal systems, have greater utility with greater numbers of adherents. Thus, using the insights of the economics of network effects is crucial to understanding property. Another potential insight stemming from our analysis is in the theory of commons
property: translation costs must be taken into account when examining collective
action solutions to tragedies of the commons.
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INTRODUCTION
Property, we are told, is a matter of state law.1 But the
world is full of localized, nonstandard property regimes that
1
See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, 130 S Ct 2592, 2597 (2010) (“Generally speaking, state law defines property
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coexist alongside state property laws. For instance, anthropologists, economists, and legal scholars have eagerly analyzed
property and quasi-property arrangements such as Native
American tribal property,2 informal property rights in favelas in
Brazil,3 the rights of the nomad Sámi in Scandinavia,4 Bedouin
rights in the Middle East,5 and collective property in kibbutzim
in Israel.6
interests.”); Barnhill v Johnson, 503 US 393, 398 (1992) (“‘[P]roperty’ and ‘interests in
property’ are creatures of state law.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va L Rev 885, 920 (2000) (stating that property interests are created
by state law).
2
See, for example, Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property
Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 Vand L Rev 1559, 1599–1600 (2001); Susan B. Bruning, Complex Legal Legacies: The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, Scientific Study, and Kennewick Man, 71 Am Antiquity 501, 507–13
(2006); Heather A. Weckbaugh, Comment, Federal Indian Law, 76 Denver U L Rev 845,
869–74 (1999); Jérémie Gilbert, Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to Nomadic Peoples’ Land Rights, 7 Hum Rts L Rev 681, 685–92 (2007).
3
See, for example, Colin Crawford, The Social Function of Property and the Human Capacity to Flourish, 80 Fordham L Rev 1089, 1105 (2011); Ngai Pindell, Finding a
Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil and in the United States,
39 Vand J Transnatl L 435, 445–47 (2006); Greg O’Hare, Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio’s Favelas, 86 Geography 61, 62 (2001); Edesio Fernandes, The Regularization of Favelas in Brazil—The Case of Belo Horizonte, 2 Soc & Leg Stud 211, 220–31
(1993) (describing the movement to grant legal title to favela dwellers); Winter King, Illegal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 Harv Intl L J 433, 440, 442–44
(2003) (suggesting that gentrification of favelas will not occur without the lure of title
ownership).
4
See, for example, Else Grete Broderstad, The Promises and Challenges of Indigenous Self-Determination: The Sami Case, 66 Intl J 893, 903 (2011); Tom G. Svensson,
Ethnopolitics among the Sámi in Scandinavia: A Basic Strategy toward Local Autonomy,
39 Arctic 208, 210–11 (1986); Tom G. Svensson, Industrial Developments and the Sámi:
Ethnopolitical Response to Ecological Crisis in the North, 29 Anthropologica 131, 141–42
(1987); Lawrence Watters, Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: Convergence from a
Nordic Perspective, 20 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 237, 282–87 (2001/2002); Gilbert, 7 Hum
Rts L Rev at 710 (cited in note 2) (discussing how usage rights to hunt across borders
were protected as early as 1751); Ivar Bjørkland, Sámi Reindeer Pastoralism as an Indigenous Resource Management System in Northern Norway: A Contribution to the
Common Property Debate, 21 Dev & Change 75, 76–77 (1990) (describing Sámi reindeer
pastoralism as the shared management of herds despite individual ownership of the animals).
5
See, for example, Yehuda Gruenberg, Note, Not All Who Wander Should Be Lost:
The Rights of Indigenous Bedouins in the Modern State of Israel, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L
185, 189 (2008); Michael Ginguld, Avi Perevolotsky, and Eugene D. Ungar, Living on the
Margins: Livelihood Strategies of Bedouin Herd-Owners in the Northern Negev, Israel, 25
Hum Ecol 567, 571–73 (1997); Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the
Law of Israel, 30 L & Socy Rev 231, 237 (1996); Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes between the Negev Bedouin and Israel, 11 Israel Stud 1, 8–14 (2006).
6
See, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315,
1347–48 (1993); Amir Helman, The Israeli Kibbutz as a Socialist Model, 148 J Inst &
Theoretical Econ 168, 170–71 (1992); M. Keren, D. Levhari, and M. Byalsky, On the Stability and Viability of Co-operatives: The Kibbutz as an Example, 56 Acta Oeconomica
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Localized property arrangements are not restricted to culturally distinct groups. They can be found in certain industries—think, for example, of the quasi-property rights in landing
slots in airports7—or certain activities, such as the virtual property of gamers.8 Indeed, they can be found in nearly all situations. Consider, for instance, the informal “ownership” arrangements that characterize the typical household.9
In one sense, this potpourri of localized property and quasiproperty regimes shares nothing in common. Some emerged
from longstanding and venerable traditions, others were shaped
by ideology, and others still were born of necessity or convenience. Some are held together by contract or other legal tools,
and others by custom or social convention. Unsurprisingly, while
each of these regimes has been studied on a stand-alone basis,
no one has ever thought to link them all. Seemingly, there is
nothing so local as localized property arrangements.
But, as we show in this Article, the very diversity of dissimilar-property and quasi-property systems gives rise to an important and ubiquitous aspect of property laws. In this Article,
we argue that examining localized property regimes as a phenomenon, together with the problems encountered by propertyholders in such regimes, shows us that property rules—in every
environment—are highly contingent on the networks in which
they operate. Property rules of one network must frequently interact with different and sometimes inconsistent rules of another network.
In other words, property rules are always limited to a social
context, and they are always vulnerable to incompatibility with
other property rules. In order for alternative localized property
arrangements to be incorporated effectively into the property
system of the jurisdiction in which they exist, they must be deciphered and translated. The need for deciphering and translating
dramatically increases the cost of maintaining alternative
301, 304–05 (2006); J. Weisman, The Kibbutz: Israel’s Collective Settlement, 1 Israel L
Rev 99, 115–21 (1966).
7
See William H. Riker and Itai Sened, A Political Theory of the Origin of Property
Rights: Airport Slots, 35 Am J Polit Sci 951, 953–56 (1991); Itai Sened and William H.
Riker, Common Property and Private Property: The Case of Air Slots, 8 J Theor Polit 427,
429–33 (1996).
8
See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 BU L Rev 1047, 1052–53 (2005);
F. Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 Cal L Rev 1,
30–34 (2004).
9
See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights
around the Hearth, 116 Yale L J 226, 277–87 (2006).
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property regimes and correspondingly diminishes the value of
assets and resources held under such regimes. Naturally, the
more complex or idiosyncratic these regimes are the greater the
cost incurred by the group adopting them.
The core insight may be explained by reference to the economic term “network effects.”10 Essentially, we argue that all legal property arrangements are characterized by network effects.
The value of legal regimes increases with the number of people
(or assets) subject to them. In that sense, the law is akin to a
technological standard.11 Adopters of the legal standards increase the value of their assets; those who opt out can only do so
at the cost of lowering the value of their assets. Like technology,
property needs to develop over time, requiring the development
of new standards and the abandonment of old ones. Transitioning between standards is costly and difficult. Sometimes,

10 For discussions of the term “network effects” in legal contexts, see Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev
479, 483 (1998); Howard A. Shelanski and J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in
Network Industries, 68 U Chi L Rev 1, 5 (2001) (“A network externality, or ‘network effect,’ exists when the value of a product or service increases with the breadth of demand
for that product or service.”). See also Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 16, 19–26 (1974); Stanley
M. Besen and Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization, 8 J Econ Persp 117, 119–21 (Spring 1994); Michael L. Katz and Carl
Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J Indust Econ 55, 57–60
(1992); Garth Saloner, Economic Issues in Computer Interface Standardization, 1 Econ
Innov & New Tech 135, 142–45 (1990); Stanley M. Besen and Garth Saloner, The Economics of Telecommunications Standards, in Robert W. Crandall and Kenneth Flamm,
eds, Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and Regulation in Communications 177, 178–89 (Brookings 1989); Janusz A. Ordover and Garth
Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert
D. Willig, eds, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 537, 563–64 (North-Holland 1989);
Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 Am Econ Rev 940, 954 (1986); Michael L. Katz
and Carl Shapiro, Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological Progress,
38 Oxford Econ Papers 146, 154–58 (Supp 1986); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro,
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J Polit Econ 822, 830–
39 (1986); Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J Econ 70, 72–74 (1985); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am Econ Rev 424, 426–34 (1985).
11 See Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects,
8 J Econ Persp 93, 96–97 (Spring 1994); Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 117–19
(cited in note 10); John T. Soma and Kevin B. Davis, Network Effects in Technology Markets: Applying the Lessons of Intel and Microsoft to Future Clashes between Antitrust and
Intellectual Property, 8 J Intel Prop L 1, 3–4 (2000) (stating that the need for compatibility between machines coupled with network effects propels pioneering technology companies to monopolies).
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pockets of holdouts remain with the old standard, even as the
new standard conquers the market.12
Our core insight also suggests an important refinement to
the study of the evolution of property institutions. It suggests
that once a society-wide property standard emerges, it becomes
increasingly difficult to preserve alternative localized regimes.
This is because the cost of deviating from the societal standard
will tend to increase over time. Consider the example of the kibbutzim in Israel. The kibbutzim were founded on the basis of a
shared, strong socialist ideology that shunned private property.13
Originally, kibbutzim absolutely prohibited private property;
members who sought to acquire private property were banished
from the community. However, over time, socialism declined in
popularity in Israel, and private property arrangements became
more popular in the society at large. As private property became
the norm in Israel, two things happened in the kibbutzim: First,
the cost of adhering to collective property arrangements within
the kibbutz increased, and second, the socialist ideology that
was once the hallmark of the kibbutzim declined in popularity.
As a result, kibbutzim gradually transitioned from collective
property to private property; that is, they gradually swapped
their idiosyncratic, localized socialist property system for one
that was closer to the free market, private property system used
by the surrounding society. Nowadays, only a few kibbutzim retain a collective property system; all the rest—several hundred
of them—have succumbed to the pressure and opted for some
version of private property.14
The general lesson is simple. Once a certain property arrangement becomes the standard in any given jurisdiction,
chances increase that alternative localized property regimes will
have to adjust over time to the norm. Of course, we are not suggesting that over time there will be perfect convergence. Alternative property regimes may survive in the long run for a variety of reasons. First, the cost of bringing them into conformity
with the standard may be too high. This may be the case with
the informal property arrangements in the favelas in Rio de

12 See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 106 (cited in note 11). See also Henry
Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 Am L & Econ Rev 1, 6–7 (2006) (describing the
possibility of network effects discouraging innovation in corporate charters).
13 See Part I.A.2.
14 See Part I.A.2.
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Janeiro and elsewhere in Brazil.15 Second, sometimes localized
gains may create an interest group strong enough to prevent
convergence even at a cost to general welfare. This can be most
easily seen in certain kinds of political resistance to change.16
Third, the general population may have a preference for preserving an alternative regime and may even be willing to subsidize
it, as may be the case with the attitude of the Norwegians to the
Sámi.17
The remainder of this Article elaborates this central claim
and unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we discuss the phenomenon
of localized property and quasi-property regimes. We demonstrate the ubiquity of such regimes and analyze their roots. In
Part II, we study the interaction between localized arrangements and the property systems that surround them. We show
that to varying degrees all localized property forms give rise to
the problem of translation—the process by which localized arrangements are operationalized within the external property
framework. We also show that the need for translation diminishes the value of alternative property arrangements for rights
holders. Furthermore, it creates an evolutionary pressure on
such forms and presents them with the choice of “comply or die.”
In Part III, we explore the circumstances in which localized
property systems will successfully resist convergence. We show
that while these examples are numerous, this is not due to the
absence of translation concerns but rather because other factors
prevent full translation of localized property systems into the
property systems of larger jurisdictions. Given this background,
we show that we should expect to continue seeing partially incompatible property systems despite translation costs. In Part
IV, we explore the implications of our analysis for ongoing property debates. These debates include the effectiveness of managing resources in the commons by tightly knit communities, the
conditions under which semicommons prove a viable stage in the
evolution of property rights, and the applicability of economist
Hernando de Soto’s observations about the importance of formalized property rights. A short conclusion follows.

15
16
17



See Part I.B.1.
See Part III.A.
See Part I.A.3.
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I. THE CREATION OF LOCALIZED PROPERTY
In this Part, we analyze the widespread phenomenon of localized property arrangements. Such arrangements may arise
on a relatively large scale that encompasses ethnic, socioeconomic, or ideological groups, or on a more modest scale that is limited to certain neighborhoods or even households. We define “localized property rights” to mean in rem arrangements that
govern the rights and duties of individuals with respect to resources that avail against all the individual members of a certain group or community. Accordingly, localized property rights
are analogous but not identical to formal property rights. Formal property rights grant in rem protection that avails against
all persons within a legal jurisdiction18 while localized property
rights avail only against persons within the localized group.
Despite their more limited scope, from the vantage point of
the relevant community or locality, localized property rights
may be more important than formal property arrangements. Localized property norms may be better tailored to the local community’s economic needs or more consistent with the community’s ideological preferences or cultural heritage. Even where
localized property rules lack formal legal backing, they may
prove durable and enforceable. Localized property rules may be
enforceable by extralegal measures. For instance, the group may
impose social penalties such as ostracism or even extralegal
penalties such as violence against group members that violate
the rules of a localized property regime.19
Localized property arrangements, on various scales, can be
seen everywhere. In the Introduction, we mentioned the norms
that evolved among various indigenous groups,20 but, in fact,
localized property arrangements exist in many other settings
that permeate our daily lives. Professor Richard Epstein, for example, described a relatively elaborate system of property rights
that evolved in different localities in the United States with

18 See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 Colum L Rev 773, 777 (2001) (“Property rights, on the other hand, are in rem—they
bind ‘the rest of the world.’”).
19 See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J
Econ Persp 137, 148–53 (Summer 2000). For a general discussion of the penalties imposed in order to enforce social norms, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 89–94
(Harvard 2000).
20 See notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
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respect to on-street parking spaces.21 Similar rights may be seen
in the arrangements that attend reserving racquetball courts or
other recreational areas.22 But perhaps an even more familiar
example can be found in the rights and duties that arise among
college roommates. Roommates typically co-own the lease rights
to the realty in which they dwell. In addition, they may purchase various home appliances, electronic devices, and computer
equipment together. As roommates acquire property, they develop a system of rules that govern exclusion, use, and transfer of
the assets.
Naturally, an in-depth discussion of all localized property
arrangements is beyond the scope of this Article. Each arrangement deserves its own article, if not book. We will confine ourselves, therefore, to a few chosen examples that represent the
broader phenomenon. The examples we discuss at a greater
length in this Article include the kibbutzim in Israel, the favelas
in Brazil, and the property rights of the Sámi in Norway, and
Native American tribe members in the United States. Even with
this restricted list, we will only be able to provide a fleeting
glimpse into those property arrangements. As should be clear,
we do not presume to make an anthropological contribution. Rather, we hope to advance our understanding of property theory
and the examples are offered strictly to this end. That said, our
examples, or case studies, are varied and cover a wide array of
property settings. In fact, it is precisely the diversity of property
options that can be found in our case studies that assure us that
the general theoretical conclusions are of general applicability
and are not dependent on any particular design of localized
property arrangements.
A.

“Official” Localized Property Regimes

We begin our examples of localized property regimes by
looking at several “official” ones. By describing these regimes as
official, we mean that even though the localized regimes employ
property rules distinct from those in the wider legal jurisdiction,
they nevertheless enjoy some kinds of formal legal recognition.
21 Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31
J Legal Stud S515, S521–43 (2002).
22 See Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1386–87 (cited in note 6). Consider Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw U L Rev 1, 19 (1986) (describing the process of reserving time in
public parks as not involving governmental support or endorsement).
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Native American (or “Indian”) property, for instance, is the subject of numerous federal laws and regulations. However, despite
the official recognition, the localized regimes remain distinct.
Different rules apply to Native American property, and the
property rights within the Native American property regime are
limited in transferability and in other ways.
1. Native American tribal property.
Native American property rights in the United States are a
peculiar blend of state law and local customs. Native Americans
were present on the land, and used it, long before the existence
of the state or the state’s extension of sovereignty to the land.
Most Native American tribes were popularly known to Europeans as American Indians, and the label continues to be used in
many contexts today23—particularly to distinguish the American
Indians from Eskimos (a name considered pejorative in Canada24)—the Native Americans found primarily in Alaska, Siberia,
Canada, and Greenland.25 We use the terms Native American
and American Indian interchangeably in this Article.
Native Americans’ customary property claims predate the
state but are considered outside the chain of title of formal statesanctioned property rights.26 Chief Justice John Marshall’s
landmark ruling in Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v M’Intosh27
established the basic rules that have shaped Native American
property rights for the past two centuries. Under Johnson, the
root of title in the United States is property rights established
by European conquerors.28 Any American Indian property rights
are inferior rights of occupancy only; not only are they inalienable to private parties and ineligible for being upgraded into
23 See, for example, Kathryn Walbert, Teaching about American Indians in North
Carolina: American Indian vs. Native American; A Note on Terminology 1.1 (North Carolina Humanities Council 2009), online at http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nc-american
-indians/5526 (visited May 9, 2013) (discussing the appropriate use of Native American
and Indian).
24 See Steve Sailer, Name Game—‘Inuit’ or ‘Eskimo’?, UPI (June 20, 2002), online
at http://www.upi.com/Odd_News/2002/06/20/Feature-Name-game-Inuit-or-Eskimo/UPI
-43191024597290 (visited May 9, 2013).
25 See Jack Utter, American Indians: Answers to Today’s Questions 103–06 (Oklahoma 2d ed 2001) (surveying the debate over terminology used to distinguish native people of North America from non-natives).
26 See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Indian Law in Property: Johnson v. M’Intosh and beyond, 37 Tulsa L Rev 521, 523–25 (2001).
27 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
28 Id at 573.
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proper title, they may be swept away by fiat of the US government.29 At the same time, Johnson preserves for Native American tribes a quasi-sovereign status. This quasi-sovereign status,
too, is inferior. Native American tribes cannot claim the rights of
independent states, and their sovereignty can be quashed by the
United States at will.30 However, so long as and to the degree
that the United States chooses to respect American Indian sovereignty, the tribes can regulate their internal affairs, including
internal property rights.31
As conventional wisdom notes, Native American conceptions
of property differed greatly from those of the European settlers.
The evidence suggests that the Native American tribes encountered by British colonists had a system of semicommons ownership similar to that used in England prior to the enclosure
movement.32 This meant that large land tracts were owned by
villages, and the village chiefs allocated use rights and possessory rights to individual tribe members for agricultural purposes.33
Other parts of the village land were preserved for nonfarming
uses, such as gathering wood.34 However, these property rights
were gradually swept away, sometimes by sales to encroaching
colonists and sometimes by forcible dispossession.35
As the United States conquered land to the Pacific, it progressively reserved Native American quasi-sovereignty to smaller and smaller areas. Native American land holdings outside
these reservations practically disappeared.36 Theoretically, the
reservations became pockets of land where Native American
property rights held.37 However, repeated US efforts to regulate
29

Id at 574.
See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272, 279 (1955).
31 See United States v Tsosie, 92 F3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir 1996) (denying a hearing
in federal court until remedies in tribal court were exhausted); Gooding v Watkins, 142 F
112, 113 (8th Cir 1905) (applying Chickasaw law in rejecting an adverse possession
claim).
32 For more on the English semicommons, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J Legal Stud 131, 160 (2000). See also
Part IV.B.
33 See Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the
Frontier 37 (Belknap 2005).
34 See id at 37–38.
35 See id at 191–226 (describing removal of more than eighty thousand Native
Americans to the west of the Mississippi from the late 1820s through the early 1840s).
36 See id at 235 (describing the US government’s adoption of the reservation approach in the early 1850s whereby “[v]irtually all Indian land cessions . . . resulted in the
designation of a circumscribed area in which the selling tribe was to live”).
37 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land at 236–37 (cited in note 33).
30
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Native American property, with mixed motives and less-thanperfect knowledge, created a system of property that was separate from the usual property law within the states but was not
quite Native American either.38
Formally, the United States holds title to the reservation
lands in trust for the tribes.39 Until the late nineteenth century,
federal law viewed reservation land as being held in common by
tribal members.40 However, in 1887, the United States adopted a
policy of “allotment,” under which reservation land was partitioned into smaller plots that could eventually be individually
owned by tribal members.41 The Dawes Act,42 which implemented the policy, remained in force until 1934.43 The law maintained
title in the federal government and allocated interests in trust to
individual Native Americans for a transitional period.44 During
the transitional period, the law forbade alienation of the land
outside the tribe while permitting the sale of leaseholds and
other lesser interests. Finally, the government claimed for itself
the right to purchase lands “not allotted.”45
As a result of the partial privatization, numerous Native
Americans sold leases and eventually title to their lands, leading
to a situation in which 86 million of the 138 million acres of reservation land were lost to Native Americans between 1887 and
38 See James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, in Jo Carrillo, ed, Readings in American
Indian Law: Recalling the Rhythm of Survival 19, 21 (Temple 1998) (“In short, the United States will permit Indians a measure of recompense [for taken land] through the law
. . . but it ultimately makes the rules and arbitrates the game.”); Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law,
46 Ark L Rev 77, 125–29 (1993).
39 See Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian
Land Consolidation Act, 85 Iowa L Rev 595, 650–51 (2000); Vickie Enis, Yours, Mine,
Ours? Renovating the Antiquated Apartheid in the Law of Property Division in Native
American Divorce, 35 Am Indian L Rev 661, 666–67 (2010–2011); Judith V. Royster, The
Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz St L J 1, 8 (1995) (“Indian lands set aside as reservations
were eventually recognized as being ‘in trust’ for the tribes.”).
40 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land at 254 (cited in note 33).
41 Dawes Act, ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), repealed by the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000 § 106(a), Pub L No 106-462, 114 Stat 2007.
42 Ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887).
43 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-383, ch 576, 48 Stat 984, codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq (effectively repealing the Dawes Act by forbidding the allotment of land by the government to any Indian). See also Graham D. Taylor, The New
Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization
Act, 1934–45 19–21 (Nebraska 1980) (recounting the effects of the Indian Reorganization
Act and the repeal of the Dawes Act).
44 Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat at 389.
45 Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat at 389. See also Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land
at 277–78 (cited in note 33).
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1934.46 The consequence was a serious erosion of Native American communities’ ability to survive cohesively. At the same time,
the restrictions on alienation of the land created highly fractionated land interests. As the Court explained in Hodel v Irving,47
“40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple
undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds,
and many parcels having dozens, of owners. Because the land
was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned,
the fractionation problem grew and grew over time.”48
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193449 ended the allotment policy but could not reaggregate the fractional holdings.
The US Congress attempted to force consolidation through escheat in the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983,50 but the
Supreme Court struck down the provision of the law as an unconstitutional uncompensated taking.51 Restrictions on alienation of reservation land remain part of US law.52 Today, some
“allotted lands” remain in trust for Native American tribes
alongside reservation lands.53 Other lands are held in trust by
states for Native Americans or held in trust by individual persons or tribes.54
The end result is a bubble of ethnically limited property
rights for Native Americans, within a wider system of state law.
However, the picture for Native Americans is considerably more
complicated. Native American property is not limited to usage
rights; Native Americans have actual, though limited title to the
land. The sovereign rights of Native American tribes are limited,
but they are considerably greater than those of the Sámi, as we
shall see.55 This means, among other things, that Native American tribes have considerable authority over land use issues on

46 See Ronald A. Janke, Population, Reservations, and Federal Indian Policy, in
Andrew Wiget, ed, Dictionary of Native American Literature 155, 159–60 (Garland 1994).
47 481 US 704 (1986).
48 Id at 707.
49 Pub L No 73-383, ch 576, 48 Stat 984, codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq.
50 Indian Land Consolidation Act § 207, Pub L No 97-459, 96 Stat 2515, 2519, codified as amended at 25 USC § 2206.
51 Hodel, 481 US at 716–17. See also Babbitt v Youpee, 519 US 234, 243–44 (1997).
52 25 USC § 464 (“Except as provided in this Act, no sale, devise, gift, exchange, or
other transfer of restricted Indian lands or of shares in the assets of any Indian tribe or
corporation organized under this Act shall be made or approved.”).
53 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land at 287–90 (cited in note 33).
54 See Nicholas E. Flanders, Native American Sovereignty and Natural Resource
Management, 26 Hum Ecol 425, 430–33 (1998).
55 See Part I.A.3.
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reservations.56 Another complication results from the federal
system that characterizes US but not Norwegian law. Property
law is generally the province of state law, rather than federal
law, in the United States. This means that understanding the
full picture of Native American property law requires examining
not only the federal law that supplants and controls Native
American law but also the state law that applies to realty geographically surrounding Native American land.
2. Kibbutzim.
Kibbutzim (kibbutzim is plural for kibbutz) are agricultural
communes that first developed in Israel a century ago. Traditionally, the kibbutz, as a collective, consisted of a small number
of families.
Degania, the first kibbutz, was established in 1909 by several dozen Jewish residents of a part of the Ottoman Empire
known as Israel or Palestine.57 Kibbutzim rapidly grew in popularity in the country, and today, there are roughly 270 kibbutzim in Israel, with a total population of approximately 120 thousand and land holdings of about 550 thousand acres.58
Most of the founders of Degania were immigrants from Russia who had arrived in Ottoman Israel/Palestine in the late
nineteenth century, and they were strongly influenced by the socialist political movements that were popular at the time in
Russia and, in particular, the Russian Jewish community.59
They established the kibbutz as an agricultural commune.
Members of the kibbutz were expected to transfer personal assets to the kibbutz upon joining it. Thus, the kibbutz itself
owned not only the land but all personal property.60 Thereafter,
56 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness
in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L Rev 1405, 1419–28 (1997) (describing how residents of the Torres-Martinez reservation dealt with dumping of waste on the reservation despite feeble help from the federal or California state governments).
57 See Yossi Katz, Agricultural Settlements in Palestine, 1882–1914, 50 Jewish Soc
Stud 63, 75–76 (1988).
58 Kibbutz Notebook *6 (The Kibbutz Movement), online at http://www.kibbutz.org.il/
tnua/dover/dafdefet_engl.pdf (visited May 9, 2013).
59 See Melford E. Spiro, Utopia and Its Discontents: The Kibbutz and Its Historical
Vicissitudes, 106 Am Anthro 556, 557 (2004).
60 See Ran Abramitzky, Lessons from the Kibbutz on the Equality–Incentives TradeOff, 25 J Econ Persp 185, 192 (Winter 2011) (noting that a ban on private property was
among the defining characteristics of the Kibbutz). In general the land “ownership” of
the kibbutz actually consists of a long-term leasehold from the state of Israel or the Jewish National Fund. For more on land ownership in Israel, see Elia Werczberger and
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members were to work the land and perform all other tasks necessary for maintenance of the kibbutz. All decisions were made
by the entire membership of the kibbutz, which would gather in
the dining hall and debate issues until resolution.61 The kibbutz
was responsible for providing members with use rights to living
quarters and living supplies, while maintaining full ownership
for itself.62
Traditional kibbutz life was austere. Kibbutz members were
traditionally rotated through jobs so that members would move
through all the jobs on the kibbutz, from accounting to dishwashing.63 Children were raised communally, spending relatively little time with their biological parents.64 Clothing was simple
and provided by the kibbutz.65 Members were given a small allowance for basic needs, unconnected to the work they performed.66 Kibbutz life was animated by an ideology of radical
equality, patriotism, Marxism, romantic attraction to “working
the land,” and self-sacrifice. Societally, kibbutz members were
viewed in Israeli society as both highly patriotic and as salt of
the earth; they were traditionally overrepresented in the most
demanding and dangerous army units.67 In the early years of the
state, kibbutzim enjoyed rapid growth, growing to 67,550 members and 214 kibbutzim by 1950.68 However, by the 1960s, the
rapid growth began to stall.69

Eliyahu Borukhov, The Israel Land Authority: Relic or Necessity?, 16 Land Use Pol 129,
132–37 (1999).
61 See Richard D. Schwartz, Democracy and Collectivism in the Kibbutz, 5 Soc
Probs 137, 141–45 (1957).
62 See Bruno Bettelheim, The Children of the Dream: Communal Child-Rearing
and American Education 351 (Avon 1969); Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 560–61 (cited in note 59).
63 See Tal Simons and Paul Ingram, Enemies of the State: The Interdependence of
Institutional Forms and the Ecology of the Kibbutz, 1910–1997, 48 Admin Sci Q 592, 593
(2003), citing A.D. Gordon, Selected Essays 63 (League for Labor Palestine 1938)
(Frances Burnce, trans).
64 See Bettelheim, Children of the Dream at 31–34 (cited in note 62); Sharone L.
Maital and Marc H. Bornstein, The Ecology of Collaborative Child Rearing: A Systems
Approach to Child Care on the Kibbutz, 31 Ethos 274, 277 (2003).
65 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 557 (cited in note 59).
66 See id. See also Bobbie Turniansky and Julie Cwikel, Volunteering in a Voluntary Community: Kibbutz Members and Voluntarism, 7 Voluntas 300, 302 (1996).
67 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 559 (cited in note 59).
68 Richard Edwards, Kibbutz Movement, in Spencer C. Tucker, ed, The Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History 581, 582 (ABCCLIO 2008).
69 See Daniel Gavron, The Kibbutz: Awakening from Utopia 6 (Rowman & Littlefield 2000).
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In the 1980s, changes in Israeli society began to be felt in
the kibbutz. Parents were no longer willing to allow their children to be raised collectively; as a result kibbutzim permitted
parents to raise their children in their own residential units
within the kibbutz.70 Even so, kibbutzim came under pressure
from the younger generation. Grown children would depart the
kibbutz for studies or travel, never to return.71 Meanwhile, those
who remained in the kibbutz would often be attracted to employment opportunities outside the kibbutz. Such members
would either be frustrated at the duties they had to perform in
the kibbutz or find themselves shirking kibbutz duties in favor
of outside employment.72 Some aging members found their ideological preferences changing against communal living, and while
they wished to continue to live on the kibbutz, they no longer
shared its collectivist ideals.73 Many of these changes were reflective of larger changes in Israeli society away from a centrally
controlled economy toward free enterprise.74
Not coincidentally, during the 1980s, the kibbutzim experienced a severe financial crisis, leading most kibbutzim to the
verge of bankruptcy.75 The financial crisis of the kibbutzim in
the 1980s was partially attributed to labor problems—both
shortages and misallocations of the existing laborers—and partially to other financial mismanagement.76 Ultimately, the kibbutzim were saved by a government bailout. The state forced
creditor banks to forgive some outstanding loans while others’
debts were directly paid by the state. Kibbutzim were forced to
relinquish some assets, including substantial land holdings.77
70 See Michal Palgi and Shulamit Reinharz, Introduction, in Michal Palgi and Shulamit Reinharz, eds, One Hundred Years of Kibbutz Life: A Century of Crises and Reinvention 1, 8 (Transaction 2011).
71 See Gavron, The Kibbutz at 6 (cited in note 69).
72 See Raymond Russell, Utopia in Zion: The Israeli Experience with Worker Cooperatives 169 (SUNY 1995).
73 See Stephen Charles Mott, The Kibbutz’s Adjustment to Industrialization and
Ideological Decline: Alternatives for Economic Organization, 19 J Religious Ethics 151,
156–57 (1991).
74 See Simons and Ingram, 48 Admin Sci Q at 595 (cited in note 63).
75 See id at 614.
76 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 559 (cited in note 59) (attributing the “crisis in the
kibbutz” to massive debt resulting from losses in the stock market, “inability to repay
excessive bank loans, and a 400 percent inflation in the Israeli economy”); Yuval Dror,
‘National Education’ through Mutually Supportive Devices: A Case Study of Zionist Education 292 (Peter Lang 2007).
77 See Jo-Ann Mort and Gary Brenner, Our Hearts Invented a Place: Can Kibbutzim
Survive in Today’s Israel? 28 (Cornell 2003) (noting an arrangement by which kibbutzim

2013]

Property Lost in Translation

531

Lacking a sufficiently large labor force to sustain the kibbutzim, and given their financial difficulties, the kibbutzim
started to diversify their economies and bring in temporary employees to fill their labor needs.78 Gradually, the kibbutzim began a process of “privatization,” in which membership in the
kibbutz no longer entailed a complete relinquishment of private
property or a thoroughly communal life. Members of the kibbutz
were granted private property rights over their homes and other
assets. Members today make their own employment arrangements and simply pay fees for kibbutz services.79 Kibbutz members receive payment for their work on the kibbutz, and such
payments reflect the differing skill levels and demands of the
employment tasks. Kibbutz-owned enterprises (not only agricultural businesses but also other kibbutz-owned ventures, such as
small manufacturing plants) were also “privatized.” While the
kibbutz continues to own the businesses, their management has
been professionalized, and the membership at large can no longer make operational and other business decisions.80 In one particularly striking example, Kibbutz Shamir’s corporation, Shamir Optical Industry, is listed on NASDAQ. These changes have
been adopted at different paces in different kibbutzim, but the
overall trajectory is clear.81
Today, privatization is almost complete in the kibbutzim. In
nearly all kibbutzim, while the kibbutz retains formal title over
realty in the kibbutz, members have recognized protected rights
to individual units.82 Kibbutz members no longer yield all outside property rights to the collective, and members therefore
own pieces of realty outside the kibbutzim. Kibbutz members
can and do use their personal assets to acquire chattel and realty to which they then hold sole title.83

relinquished up to 40 percent of their agricultural land to relieve their debts); Uriel Leviatan, Jack Quarter, and Hugh Oliver, Introduction: The Kibbutz in Crisis, in Uriel Leviatan, Hugh Oliver, and Jack Quarter, eds, Crisis in the Israeli Kibbutz: Meeting the
Challenge of Changing Times vii, xv (Praeger 1998).
78 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 562 (cited in note 59).
79 See id at 561.
80 See Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Crisis and Transformation: The Kibbutz at Century’s
End 109–10 (SUNY 1997).
81 See Ayala Cnaan, Holy Land of Aliens: Formal Governance Mechanisms in Israeli Alternative Communities *69–73 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 2007) (on file at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute).
82 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 561 (cited in note 59).
83 See id.



532

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:515

Kibbutzim are recognized legal entities under the Cooperative Societies Ordinance, 1933.84 As cooperative societies, kibbutzim benefit from favorable tax treatment, as well as other
specialized rules related to its status as a separate legal personality.85 Ultimately, this means that, as far as the state is concerned, kibbutzim own property rights that are similar to those
owned by any other legal person in the state. However, within
the kibbutz, the rights of members are established by the internal rules of the kibbutz, either by the governing documents or by
ongoing decisions of the collective.86 Consequently, member
property rights are only enforceable outside the kibbutz to the
extent permitted by internal kibbutz rules, and as contractual
rights only.87
3. Sámi.
The Sámi (or Saami) are a people indigenous to the Arctic
circle in an area called Sápmi—northern Scandinavia (Norway,
Sweden and northern Finland) as well as the Kola Peninsula in
Russia.88 In the past, the Sámi were often referred to as “Lapps”
or “Laplanders” and their region “Lapland,” but these latter
terms have fallen out of usage and are now considered pejorative.89 Physical remnants of Sámi inhabitation of the Sápmi area
have been found from as far back as 10,000 BC.90
The four states over which Sápmi territory is now spread
extended their sovereignty into the area relatively recently. The

84 1 The Laws of Palestine in Force on the 31st Day of December, 1933 360 (Waterlow and Sons 1934) (Robert Harry Drayton, ed). See also James Horrox, City Communes
in Israel: Prolegomena to a Morphology of Urban Communalism, 31 Communal Societies
21, 33 (2011).
85 See, for example, Joshua Muravchik, Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism 327 (Encounter 2002). See also Gavron, The Kibbutz at 220 (cited in note 69).
86 See T.M.S. Evens, Two Kinds of Rationality: Kibbutz Democracy and Generational Conflict 40–42 (Minnesota 1995).
87 See Daniel Gavron, Intentional Communities in Israel—Current Movement, in
Karen Christensen and David Levinson, eds, 2 Encyclopedia of Community: From the
Village to the Virtual World 727, 728 (Sage 2003).
88 See Torbjörn Josefsson, Ingela Bergman, and Lars Östland, Quantifying Sami
Settlement and Movement Patterns in Northern Sweden 1700–1900, 63 Arctic 141, 142
(2010).
89 See Barbara Helen Miller, Connecting and Correcting: A Case Study of Sami
Healers in Porsanger 1 (CNWS 2007).
90 See Valerie Alia, The New Media Nation: Indigenous Peoples and Global Communication 63 (Berghahn 2010).
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area of Sápmi incorporated into Norway is called Finnmark.91
While Norway traces its statehood to 872, Finnmark only gradually became part of Norway starting in 1613 (the coastal areas)
and finishing in 1826, with the establishment of a border with
Russia.92 Obviously, Sámi were living in and using the land long
before Norway extended its sovereignty into the area.
A 1775 distribution of land by the state is considered the
root of title in the Finnmark area of Norway.93 Large areas were
excluded from this process of distributing private title and were
reserved as state land. Starting in 1863, Norway established
strict guidelines for transferring state land to private purchasers.94 While Sámi were eventually permitted to purchase land,
this was often conditioned on “Norwegianization,” that is, adoption of a Norwegian name and demonstration of facility in the
Norwegian language.95 While some Sámi assimilated and acquired land, others refused to do so and found their customary
landholdings were owned by the state.96
Outside the formal Norwegian system, the Sámi have had
longstanding customary reindeer pasture rights. These customary rights include defined fishing areas, hunting grounds, gathering places, trapping lines, and specific reindeer pastures.
Boundaries were historically set by tradition and memorialized
verbally.97 These customary rights were considered outside the
chain of title in Norway, and thus had no legal expression.
The past three decades have seen a change in attitudes toward Sámi land claims. The Norwegianization policy has been
91 Garth Nettheim, Gary D. Meyers, and Donna Craig, Indigenous Peoples and
Governance Structures: A Comparative Analysis of Land and Resource Management
Rights 210 (Aboriginal Studies 2002).
92 Id.
93 See Øyvind Ravna, Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights through Modern
Legislation. The Case of the Sami People in Norway, in Mona Elisabeth Brøther and JonAndreas Solberg, eds, 2 Legal Empowerment—A Way out of Poverty 65, 67 (Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).
94 See Sally Jeanrenaud, Communities and Forest Management in Western Europe:
A Regional Profile of the Working Group on Community Involvement in Forest Management 20 (IUCN 2001); G. Tandberg, Agriculture, in Sten Konow and Karl Fischer, eds,
Norway: Official Publication for the Paris Exhibition 1900 307, 310 (Kristiania 1900).
95 See Monika Žagar, Knut Hamsun: The Dark Side of Literary Brilliance 165
(Washington 2009).
96 See id at 164–66. See also Christian Momberger, Arctic Regions, the Sámi and
Global Climate Change Debate: Collection of Essays and Papers Written 2001/2002 within the Arctic Studies Program 19–20 (GRIN Verlag 2002).
97 See Tom Svensson, The Attainment of Limited Self-Determination among the
Sami in Recent Years, in René Kuppe and Richard Potz, eds, 8 Law and Anthropology
267, 272 (Martinus Nijhoff 1996).
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abandoned, and some powers have been devolved to a representative Sámi body.98 As well, ownership over state lands has
been transferred to a new governmental body that is expected to
cooperate better with Sámi needs.99 These changes have been
driven both by changing perceptions of the justice of Sámi claims
and the belief that some changes were required by changing international norms to which Norway had subjected itself.100
The most important of these changes has resulted in Norway creating public easements over lands in Finnmark (both
publicly and privately owned) for the benefit of Sámi. Reindeer
pasture area is reserved for Sámi reindeer herding; Sámi also
have herding rights in “concession areas,” but those rights are
shared with other Norwegians.101 The Reindeer Herding Act of
1978102 reserves Sámi herding rights to those of a Sámi family,
though the familial connection is not precisely defined.103 Additionally, to enjoy the Sámi herding rights, the claimant must
have had a parent or grandparent whose main occupation was
reindeer herding.104 The herding rights are formalized in operational permits, which may be passed inter vivos or upon death to
close family relations.105 Herding rights include not only reindeer
grazing but also the right to dwell on the land, build necessary
structures, trap and fish, gather wood, and other uses of the
land.106
The resulting property system is a curious blend of state law
and local Sámi customs. Formal property rights depend upon
the state titling system and usage rights created under state
98 See Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law:
From Victims to Actors 236 (Transnational 2006).
99 See id at 237.
100 See id.
101 See E. Carina H. Keskitalo, Climate Change and Globalization in the Arctic: An
Integrated Approach to Vulnerability Assessment 99 (Earthscan 2008).
102 See Lov 9 June 1978 nr 49 om reindrift (Reindeer Herding Act of June 9, 1978 no
49), repealed by Lov 15 June 2007 nr 40 om reindrift (Reindeer Herding Act of June 15,
2007 no 40).
103 See Margaret Anne Stephenson, Sámi Lands and Indigenous Australian Lands:
Some Comparative Perspectives, in Günter Minnerup and Pia Solberg, eds, First World,
First Nations: Internal Colonialism and Indigenous Self-Determination in Northern Europe and Australia 168, 175 (Sussex Academic 2011).
104 See id.
105 See Lov 9 June 1978 nr 49 om reindrift § 4 (Reindeer Herding Act of June 9,
1978 no 49 § 4). See also Elisabeth Einarsbøl, Reindeer Husbandry Rights in Norway
(Gáldu: Resource Centre for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2005), online at
http://www.galdu.org/web/index.php?artihkkal=259&giella1=eng (visited May 9, 2013).
106 See Stephenson, Sámi Lands and Indigenous Australian Lands at 174–75 (cited
in note 103).
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law. However, state law carves out ethnically limited property
rights for Sámi, facilitating the preservation (or creation) of localized property rules within Sámi communities. Additionally,
the formal rights are ethnically bound, creating a localized property system partially divorced from the wider property law within the jurisdiction.
B.

“Unofficial” Localized Property Regimes
1. Favelas.

In sharp contrast to kibbutzim, favelas in Brazil were not
conscious creations in expression of a romantic ideology. Favela
is a Portuguese term for slum, and favelas are generally described as “shanty towns.”107 The favelas were created primarily
during the twentieth century as a result of rural emigration to
the cities.108 Favela dwellers were traditionally squatters. That
is, favela dwellers had no formally recognized legal rights to the
land on which they lived; rather, they generally took up residence on either private or public lands.109 In other cases, the favela residents did not trespass on private or public landholdings,
but they still failed to acquire formal property rights. For instance, in many cases, favelas arose after the “purchase” of irregular lots of land, whose demarcation could not be recognized
under existing law.110 In such cases, the seller wished to sell land
and the buyer wished to buy, but state law would not recognize
the sale because the lot size did not fit within titling rules.
Whether arising due to squatting or unlawful subdivision of
land, favelas developed socially respected property norms notwithstanding the lack of formal property rights. The favelas recognized dwellers’ informal property rights to their homes, as
well as the authority of complex community institutions.111
Favelas date back to a settlement on a hill in Rio de Janeiro
called Morro da Providência, founded by soldiers returning from

107

See Crawford, 80 Fordham L Rev at 1105 (cited in note 3).
Martin Mowforth, Clive Charlton, and Ian Munt, Tourism and Responsibility:
Perspectives from Latin America and the Caribbean 186 (Routledge 2008).
109 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62 (cited in note 3).
110 Id.
111 See Peter Lloyd-Sherlock, The Recent Appearance of Favelas in São Paolo City:
An Old Problem in a New Setting, 16 Bull Latin Am Rsrch 289, 292 (1997); Peter Hall
and Ulrich Pfeiffer, Urban Future 21: A Global Agenda for Twenty-First Century Cities
254 (E & FN Spon 2000).
108
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a civil war (Guerra de Canudos, 1895–96).112 The soldiers had
not yet been paid, and they did not purchase the land on which
they built their new settlement, Morro da Favela. Subsequent
urban squatting settlements earned the name “favela” in imitation of the soldiers’ community, both for the practice of squatting
and for the low quality of land and housing.113 As the urban settlements became more popular, the term gained formal acceptance, even being used as a category in the Brazilian census
in 1950.114 Favelas grew explosively from the 1940s to the 1970s
due to increasing urbanization.115 Today, Rio de Janeiro is home
to hundreds of favelas, and approximately 14.4 percent of its
residents live in favelas and other “subnormal agglomerates.”116
Favelas continue to grow at a faster pace than the population of
the city as a whole.117
Strikingly, many favelas in Rio de Janeiro are located on
hillsides, giving favelas scenic views—particularly when compared to the obstructed views of more affluent housing in the
valleys below—but also exposing them to soil erosion, mudslides,
and collapse.118 Favelas are better known for their high crime
rates and substandard living conditions.119 While favelas are
complete communities, with local businesses such as groceries,
they have limited access to basic utility services such as plumbing or electricity. In most favelas, sewage runs through the

112 Adrian Parr, Hijacking Sustainability 128 (MIT 2009); Greg O’Hare and Michael
Barke, The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis, 56 GeoJournal
225, 232 (2002) (stating that Morro da Providência was established in 1898 by soldiers
returning to Rio de Janeiro from war who were unable to afford shelter); Janice E. Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro 13 (California 1976).
113 Monique M. Vallance, Favelas, in John J. Crocitti and Monique M. Vallance, eds,
1 Brazil Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Republic 253, 253 (ABC-CLIO 2012). See
Lloyd-Sherlock, 16 Bull Latin Am Rsrch at 290 (cited in note 111).
114 See Fred B. Morris and Gerald F. Pyle, The Social Environment of Rio de Janeiro
in 1960, 47 Econ Geography 286, 288 (1971).
115 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality at 5 (cited in note 112).
116 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2010 Census: 11.4 Million Brazilians
(6.0%) Live in Subnormal Agglomerates (Dec 21, 2011), online at http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/
presidencia/noticias/noticia_impressao.php?id_noticia=2057 (visited May 9, 2013).
117 Janice E. Perlman, Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of Rio de
Janeiro, 1969–2002, in Ananya Roy and Nezar AlSayyad, eds, Urban Informality:
Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia 104,
108 (Lexington 2004).
118 O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 229 (cited in note 112) (“In Rio (as in Salvador) many favela sites on hillsides close to the city centre . . . are unsuitable for commercial development and therefore have not been cleared wholesale by the city authorities.”).
119 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62–63 (cited in note 3).
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streets.120 The 1950 census criteria defined favelas not only by
the absence of legal title but also by low quality housing and in
the absence of paved streets and public services such as plumbing, sanitation, water, electricity, and telephone.121
Over the years, favelas have been subject to numerous reform efforts. Controversial “slum clearance” projects, particularly in the 1970s, aimed at reclaiming the land for its private and
public owners.122 These projects, in some cases accompanied by
efforts to provide public housing for the slum dwellers, are widely viewed as failures.123 In some cases, after an area was cleared,
new favelas grew up on the site of the old ones.124 In many cases,
expelled favela dwellers soon found themselves living in different favelas.125 Simply put, the demand for the favela-style housing remained high while the supply in the formal market remained low, leading consumers to the low-cost alternative of
squatting in a new location. Other reform efforts have focused
on arrangements for legalizing land tenure for dwellers while
upgrading the physical quality of neighborhoods.126 In recent
years, both strategies have been tried by various municipalities
in Brazil.127 To date, progress has been limited.128 Favelas continue to grow.129
The reason for favelas’ continued popularity remains a matter of controversy. Evidently favelas provide migrants to the large
cities with goods that are not available in the formal housing
120
121
122

Id at 71.
Morris and Pyle, 47 Econ Geography at 288 (cited in note 114).
O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 234 (cited in note 112):

With the help of funds from the US Alliance for Progress programme, between
1962 and 1974, 80 squatter settlements were compulsorily (sometimes violently) removed. . . . These processes gained in intensity after the 1964 military
coup when squatter areas adjacent to upper-income neighbourhoods and areas
scheduled for industrial development began to be eradicated.
123

See, for example, O’Hare, 86 Geography at 63 (cited in note 3).
Marshall C. Eakin, Brazil: The Once and Future Country 107 (St Martin’s 1997)
(“City planners tried to raze the favelas and relocate the poor in government housing,
which was often miles from the inner city. By the 1970s, it had become clear that this
process was not working and that the tidal wave of poor migrants had overwhelmed any
pretense of relocation.”).
125 Vanessa N. Francis, Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Urban Housing Initiatives in South America: Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paolo *31–32 (unpublished
MRCP thesis, Morgan State University, 2007) (on file at Morgan State University).
126 See O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 238 (cited in note 112) (describing a reform program whereby favelados are given title to their homes).
127 See id; Francis, Comparative Analysis at *56–61 (cited in note 125).
128 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62, 73 (cited in note 3).
129 Consider O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 238 (cited in note 112).
124



538

The University of Chicago Law Review

[80:515

market: cheap, conveniently located housing, even if of inferior
quality and provided with inferior services. The reason for the
lack of affordable housing might be excessive regulation of the
quality and pricing of housing in the formal market.130
2. Other “unofficial” localized property regimes.
Although we have chosen to focus on a small number of
large-scale localized property regimes, readers should be aware
that there are many other examples of localized property regimes that affect our lives. Two of the best known regimes that
have been the subject of academic study include the norms of
cattle trespass in Shasta County, as described in Professor Robert Ellickson’s classic Order without Law131 and Professor Erving
Goffman’s account of property arrangements in mental asylums.132
Professor Ellickson’s famous book Order without Law contains, among other features, a fascinating account of the allocation of grazing grounds in Shasta County, California. Tellingly,
Professor Ellickson discovered that the formal legal classification of land as either open or closed to free grazing is highly irrelevant in Shasta County, as it was largely replaced by a set of
local norms and understandings that are modeled on principles
of good “neighborliness.”133
Professor Goffman’s account of property arrangements in
mental asylums is one of the most moving property stories one
can find. Professor Goffman reports that upon checking into an
asylum, patients are stripped of all their personal belongings.
Thereafter, they embark upon a long journey of property collection. Professor Goffman discusses in great detail the process by
which different items are appropriated and stored. But, perhaps,
the most interesting aspect of this property regime is that the
staff largely respects the norms that arise among patients and
under most circumstances cooperate with them.134
130 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 65–66 (cited in note 3). See also Maria Teresa Xavier
Souza, The Effect of Land Use Regulation on Housing Price and Informality: A Model
Applied to Curitiba, Brazil *11–12 (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Maryland–College Park, 2009), online at http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/9290/1/
Souza_umd_0117E_10314.pdf (visited May 9, 2013).
131 Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard
1991).
132 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and
Other Inmates 227–54 (Aldine 1961).
133 Ellickson, Order without Law at 40–64 (cited in note 131).
134 Goffman, Asylums at 244–54 (cited in note 132).
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Other localized property regimes have not won such careful
academic attention. Localized property arrangements are ubiquitous in urban life, but few have been examined systematically.
As we noted, Professor Epstein famously researched the localized property regime covering parking places on public streets,135
but there are many other localized regimes to consider. Think,
for example, of the rules that govern using playground facilities
or ball fields. Some areas have formal rules requiring users to
sign up for use in fixed time slots. Disputes often arise when users deviate from the expected time limits. Other areas allow allocation of the space but on a more informal basis. Persons may
arrive early and “stake a claim” on the space until other users
arrive. In yet other settings, there is no real principle of organization, and a combination of deference, aggressiveness, and priority in time govern. For examples of this last phenomenon,
think of seating in subways or parking in shopping malls.
Localized property regimes also govern the allocation of
space in public squares to street performers. Different cities
have adopted different priority rules to determine how space on
sidewalks, parks, and plazas is to be allocated among street performers. Some cities have registration systems that allow street
performers to establish temporal priority.136 In others, no advance registration is possible and priority is established by first
occupancy.137 In yet other cities the allocation may be based on
seniority.138 Whatever the norm is, new artists who wish to perform must comply with it, even though they did not partake in
the decision to adopt it.
Yet another localized property system strikes even closer to
home—at least as far as the authors are concerned—as it governs the allocation of office space to law school faculty.139 This
example is particularly interesting as it involves an informal
property allocation among individuals who are trained in formal
135

Epstein, 31 J Legal Stud at S521–43 (cited in note 21).
See, for example, David Grazian, Blue Chicago: The Search for Authenticity in
Urban Blues Clubs 225 (Chicago 2003) (discussing registration procedures for street performers in Chicago); NYC Code § 10-108; Street Performances in New York, 411 New York (July
16, 2007), online at http://411newyork.org/guide/2007/07/16/street-performances-in-new-york
(visited May 9, 2013).
137 See, for example, Aram Parrish Lief, Musicians Who Busk: Identity, Career, and
Community in New Orleans Street Performance *59 (unpublished MS thesis, University of
New Orleans, 2008), online at http://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1683&context=td (visited May 9, 2013).
138 See, for example, id at *57.
139 See generally Roderick A. Macdonald, Office Politics, 40 U Toronto L J 419 (1990).
136
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law, yet it gives rise to very few disputes (although it is not impossible that it generates discontent). Interestingly, there is variance among schools both with respect to allocation rules and
termination rules. In some schools, office space is allocated
based on seniority. However, the definition of seniority may differ from school to school. In some schools, seniority is calculated
based on the year of one’s first law degree. In other schools, seniority may be based on one’s tenure in the institution—that is,
the date on which the member joined the faculty. Still in other
institutions, office space may be allocated based on merit as
measured by scholarly productivity or teaching success. As for
termination, in almost all schools (as far as we know) once an office space has been allocated to a member it is hers until retirement, unless she voluntarily decides to relinquish her rights to
the space. Yet, in a very small minority of schools, decline in performance may cost one one’s office space.
C.

The Attractions of Localized Property Systems

Why do localized property systems arise?
Simply put, communities or groups of individuals may need
or want acceptable arrangements for allocating entitlements to
assets that do not match the statewide arrangements. We offer
four reasons why such localized property rights might arise, although we do not claim that the list is comprehensive. Additionally, we observe that in many cases, more than one reason may
apply.
First, the formal property system may be too rigid, or restrictive, for certain individuals. They may desire more flexible,
or adaptable, arrangements. Consider the case of family members living in the same household, or of roommates. Given their
ongoing relationships, family members or roommates may find
the costs of negotiating rights for any individual item to be relatively low. They may therefore prefer to avoid the strictures of
the formal legal system and opt, instead, into a less formal system of norms and property arrangements. Indeed, they may consider the reliance on state-ordered property rights to undermine
the network of negotiated arrangements governing the household. Stated otherwise, in many situations of ongoing relationships, the transaction costs of the informal system will be lower
than the transaction costs entailed in formal definition of rights
through the legal system.
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Second, the formal legal system may adopt a property regime that is inherently inconsistent with the needs of the group.
In particular, this may happen when the ideology of a certain
group rejects the standard allocation and definition of private
property rights. This is what happened in the case of the kibbutzim in Israel. The state adopted a system of private property
rights that was typical for Western states while the kibbutzim
were founded on the basis of a radical collectivist ideology that
rejected any private property.140 In economic terms, we might
say that the local property regime gives its participants psychological and ideological utility that adequately compensates for
the loss of utility entailed in having property rights that are unrecognized in the statewide property system.
Third, the closed list (numerus clausus) of property rights
may simply not contain certain property options desired by
members of various groups. After all, the enumeration of property rights is finite, which means that certain arrangements will
not be included in it.141 This reason perhaps best explains the
rules that govern various common interest communities, such as
subdivisions with condominium ownership.142 Property law has
traditionally provided a very small list of rules for common owners and for neighbors. Persons buying condominium units will
want to govern many other items left out of the default standard
property rules. While condominiums can anchor some of their
rules in standard property instruments, such as covenants, they
may also find it advantageous to leave other rules to management from time to time. Property forms, in other words, may
prove to have positive utility in local settings, even though the
law may not recognize their utility across society.
Fourth, and finally, satellite rules that attend the property
system may lead groups to avoid the property system in order to
avoid the satellite rules. The clearest example of this is the system of satellite land use laws that circumscribe property rights

140

See Part I.A.2.
For a discussion of the numerus clausus rule in property law, see Thomas W.
Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L J 1, 9–42 (2000); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 Vand L Rev 1597, 1636–55 (2008); Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J Legal Stud S373, S382–85 (2002).
142 For a discussion of the property forms used by condominiums and other commoninterest communities, see Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108
Yale L J 1163, 1183–85 (1999).
141
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over realty.143 While the legal system may offer a satisfactory
menu of property choices in realty, would-be consumers may
find that the ability to shape the property is so hampered by
land use rules, construction regulations, or other limitations on
owners’ ability to utilize their realty that the consumers will
readily forego the benefits of state-recognized property ownership in order to avoid the limitations.144 As the case of the favelas shows, this need not be a conscious choice. The licit marketplace for realty may be sufficiently restricted by the satellite
limitations in land use that a large secondary market develops
for realty ownership that is recognized only by the illicit local
property system.
II. TRANSLATING LOCALIZED PROPERTY
Our goal in this Part is to explore the interaction between
localized property arrangements and the formal property system. As we show, all localized property arrangements give rise
to the challenge of translation—the process by which localized
rights are incorporated into the state system.
Although there are strong reasons for creating localized
property regimes, these reasons do not eliminate the desire to
use assets in interacting with the larger society. The need for
translation arises whenever a person who possesses localized
property rights seeks to make use of them outside the group or
community in which they are recognized. To illustrate, consider
a Native American individual who wishes to use her tribal property as collateral for a loan from a commercial bank. Can she do
it?145 A similar question arises when a member of the Sámi seeks
to continue to use traditional pasture lands after they have been
subjected to state ownership146 or when a kibbutz member

143

See id at 1173.
See Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 Colum L Rev 883, 898–903 (2007).
145 See, for example, Marceau v Blackfeet Housing Authority, 540 F3d 916, 936 (9th
Cir 2008) (explaining that Congress’s decision to hold tribal land in trust prevents Native Americans from using their land as security for loans). See also Matthew Atkinson,
Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands, Resources, and People,
23 Okla City U L Rev 379, 399 (1998) (“Indian land, which is held in ‘trust’ for them by
the United States, cannot be used as collateral to obtain loans. This is but one obstacle to
Indian private entrepreneurship or initiative.”).
146 For discussion, see Øyvind Ravna, The Process of Identifying Land Rights in
Parts of Northern Norway: Does the Finnmark Act Prescribe an Adequate Procedure within the National Law?, 3 Yearbook Polar L 423, 444–50 (2011).
144
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decides to start a new life in the city and wishes to take several
personal articles with her.147
In this Part, we analyze the parameters that affect the desirability of localized property arrangements and their value to
their subjects. We demonstrate that in the world of property, the
sustainability of localized property rights critically depends on
their translatability. Lower translatability of property rights
lessens the value of those rights, and conversely, greater translatability increases the value of those rights.
Consider, for example, the unregistered rights of the dwellers in the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. These rights are not formally recognized by the Brazilian legal system and are only recognized by fellow dwellers.148 Consequently, rights holders can
transfer their rights only to other dwellers, but not to outsiders.
A rights holder in a favela cannot borrow money from a bank on
the security of her landholding, and she cannot sell her rights to
someone outside the favela.149 These limitations on the property’s use and transferability undermine the value of the property
right and make the de facto rights of favela dwellers more limited than comparable rights that are recognized formally.150 In
the case of kibbutz members, the result can be even more extreme. In a notable Israeli case, the daughter of a deceased
147 In Rotem v Kibbutz Sdot Yam, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that beneficiaries of a testamental gift of all the testatrix’s possessions could claim no rights in her
house in the kibbutz because the kibbutz owned all rights in the realty, and the procedure in which the kibbutz “allocated” the house to the testatrix merely granted her temporary use rights. Rotem v Kibbutz Sdot Yam, CA 5747/08 ¶ 21 (2010), online at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/470/057/t04/08057470.t04.pdf (visited May 9, 2013).
148 See Michael Geiger Donovan, At the Doors of Legality: Planners, Favelados, and
the Titling of Urban Brazil *322 (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California–Berkeley, 2007) (on file at University of California–Berkeley):

With high registration costs, a distrust of government intervention, and increasing segregation, there are signs that informal settlements are developing
their own property registries independent of government authorities. . . . [In
one informal settlement] [t]welve thousand homeowners have received this
[unofficial] title for the equivalent of one dollar each although it has no official
legal recognition.
149 See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the
West and Fails Everywhere Else 56 (Basic Books 2000):

The lack of legal property thus explains why citizens in developing and former
communist nations cannot make profitable contracts with strangers, cannot get
credit, insurance, or utilities services: They have no property to lose. . . . And
commitment is better understood when backed up by a pledge of property,
whether it be a mortgage, a lien, or any other form of security that protects the
other contracting party.
150



For an extensive examination of this phenomenon, see id at 39–67.
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kibbutz member was left homeless because her late mother’s
possessions all formally belonged to the kibbutz.151
A.

The Costs of Translation

Translation problems arise when persons with localized
property rights to an asset desire to use the asset outside the locality in which the localized property rights are recognized. This
desire may be created by the decision of the asset owner to leave
the community. Alternatively, the owner may wish to remain in
the community but wish only to remove the asset from it. Or,
perhaps, the asset owner may seek to keep the asset physically
within the community but to use the asset in some way outside
the locality (for example, by mortgaging or otherwise using the
asset as security for a loan). At any rate, the moment the asset
is used outside the locality, the localized rights have to be translated into rights in the wider jurisdiction.
As we will show presently, the ability to translate the localized property rights into rights recognized by the wider jurisdiction is extremely valuable. Translatable property rights are
more readily transferred and used than localized rights, and it is
easier to enjoy value (by use, transfer, exclusion, or otherwise)
over broadly recognized property rights than narrowly recognized ones.
However, translation is not costless. Three kinds of costs
generally accompany any translation of localized property
rights.
Perhaps the most obvious type of costs are information
costs. Professor Henry Smith has written about such costs in the
context of community customs,152 but such costs attend all localized property systems. Information about the local rights,
151

Rotem, CA 5747/08 at ¶ 29.
Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 Theoretical Inq L 5, 13–
15 (2009). Others have written extensively on custom, its development, and its potential
place in legal ordering. See, for example, Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical
Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U Chi L Rev 710, 713
(1999); Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State 30–36 (Pacific
Research 1990); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L Rev 1643, 1647
(1996); Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne
Fairs, 2 Econ & Polit 1, 2 (1990); Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 Tex L Rev 1153, 1153–61 (2012). Insofar as the custom is understood as creating a parallel legal order for merchants in a certain line of business, it can be seen as a
localized property system to which our analysis applies.
152
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ownership, and the asset must be transmitted to the larger jurisdiction. Acquiring expertise in these matters requires gathering evidence and investing time. The more idiosyncratic the localized property system, the greater the informational costs will
be in translating localized rights to the wider world.
Second, and more importantly, owners will encounter incompatibility costs. Generally, the precise rights created by the
localized property system are not recognized by the wider jurisdiction. Alternatively, they can be enforced only if described in
imprecise terms (for example, enforcing kibbutz property rights
only as contractual rights or as a partnership agreement).153
Consequently, certain subtleties in the local property rights will
be lost; to the degree that those subtleties accurately served local needs, this may result in a loss to net welfare. The most extreme case of incompatibility costs arises where there are open
contradictions between the rights within the localized property
system and those of the state system. For instance, while residents “own” land in favelas under the localized property system,
in many cases that land already belongs to others under the
state system.154
Third, and finally, there are potential enforcement costs.
Those rights that are compatible with the larger outside property system must be enforced in that outside system. This cost
may be large or small, depending on the comparable costs of enforcement within the localized system. There may even be cases
where outside enforcement proves cheaper than enforcement
within the localized property system.
Both information costs and incompatibility costs grow as the
similarity between the localized property rights and those of the
wider jurisdiction’s property rights diminish. The more unfamiliar the local property rights, the greater the information costs
will be in any translation. Likewise, the larger the gap between
the localized property right and the rights recognized by the
larger jurisdiction, the greater the likelihood of lost subtleties
and the higher the incompatibility costs will be.
153 See Rotem, CA 5747/08 at ¶¶ 13–19 (rejecting a claimed property right in residence on grounds that members are restricted to contractual rights as expressed in the
kibbutz regulations).
154 Licia Valladares, Popular Housing in Brazil: A Review, in Willem van Vliet,
Elizabeth Huttman, and Sylvia Fava, eds, Housing Needs and Policy Approaches: Trends
in Thirteen Countries 222, 225 (Duke 1985); Vicente del Rio, Favela, in Roger W. Caves,
ed, Encyclopedia of the City 176, 176 (Routledge 2005); Souza, Effect of Land Use Regulation at *12 (cited in note 130).
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One way of describing the problem of translation is through
the prism of transaction costs. In a world with perfect information about rights, and infinitesimal costs of contracting, the
gaps between localized property regimes and wider state property systems would be irrelevant. Any person who wanted to establish her localized property rights in the wider property system could costlessly let everyone know about the rights she
wanted to protect and could contract costlessly with them to defend her rights.
As Professor R.H. Coase reminded us, however, we do not
live in a world without transaction costs.155 In the real world,
costs always attend transactions. Property rights in the Coasian
world are the baselines from which negotiations are conducted,
but where transaction costs are sufficiently high, parties will
never depart from the baseline.156 In the locality within which
the localized property regime prevails, local property is the baseline. But outside the locality, the baseline is the prevalent
statewide property regime. An owner of a localized property
right who wishes to transact with others who do not recognize
her right will have to face the costs of information, incompatibility, and enforcement. For instance, she will have to educate others about the nature of her rights, their scope and their precise
contours. The more idiosyncratic the localized rights are, the
higher the cost of education. Of course, the holder of the localized right will have to repeat the process with every new individual with whom she wishes to transact. The more unfamiliar
the right at issue is, the greater will be the expected number of
interactions that the rights holder will have to go through to
consummate a transaction.

155

R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15 (1960):

In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely
costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would
be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.
156

Id at 15–16:

Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is
clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about.
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Even more troubling than the problem of education will be
those of incompatibilities between legal forms and enforcement.
Owners of localized property rights will have to convince persons
outside the locality of the merits and value of the localized property right. Outside the locality, only those who voluntarily subject themselves to the localized property regime can be held to it.
This means that rights holders or potential rights holders will
have to negotiate with a wide variety of potential parties for the
rights to maintain the value of the localized property rights.
Consider, for example, a localized property right in a house in a
kibbutz. If the kibbutz member goes to a bank to get a loan secured by a mortgage on the house, the bank’s reluctance to issue
the loan will not be assuaged simply by an explanation of the
nature of the kibbutz member’s rights in the house. The bank
will also be concerned about its ability to realize gains from a
foreclosure sale of the house in the event of default. While fellow
kibbutz members will understand and value the rights in the
house, few persons outside the kibbutz will. This means that the
bank’s ability to recover funds from selling the house will rely on
its ability to persuade potential buyers outside the kibbutz of the
value of holding kibbutz-defined rights in the house. If, as is
likely, prohibitive transaction costs prevent the bank from creating a large pool of potential buyers of the rights in the house, the
bank will attach a small value to the mortgage. The security
value of the house will have been largely lost in the attempt to
translate the kibbutz-centered property rights to the outside
world.
In some cases, the contradictions between the rights recognized within the localized property system and those between
the state’s property system will make the challenge even greater. Where a favela homeowner seeks a mortgage, the favela resident has to face all the challenges of the kibbutz resident, plus
an additional one. Sometimes, the favela resident’s localized
property right relates to realty to which title already belongs to
another party. As long as there is a nontrivial chance that the
true owner’s title may be asserted in the future, banks and other
potential creditors must discount the value of the localized property interest.157 If the chances of a future assertion of title by the
true owner are sufficiently high, the localized property right will
be utterly unmarketable.
157



See, for example, De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 91 (cited in note 149).
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Hence, from a transaction costs perspective localized property arrangements can serve as lock-in devices that make it harder for members of the relevant group to exit the group and move
elsewhere. In that sense, they perform the same function as
switching fees that are employed by cable and telephone companies to keep subscribers from switching to a different provider.
In our case, however, the switching cost is not predetermined in
advance by the provider as a price or penalty, but rather it is
measured by the size of the incompatibility between the localized arrangement and the formal property system. The greater
the incompatibility, the greater the cost of switching. The example of the kibbutz members in the early days of the movement
provides the best illustration of this effect.158
B.

Law and Network Effects

Another theoretical framework for understanding the challenges presented by translation may be found in the literature
on network effects and technological standards.
Products and services that display network effects differ
from other products and services in that their values tend to
grow with the number of users.159 The classic example is telephony.160 A telephone apparatus is valueless for the first user as
long as no one else has one. She cannot call anyone, nor can she
receive calls. Once a second person purchases a phone, the
phones have a modicum of value for both the subsequent purchaser and the first user. The two users can now converse by
telephone, although the phone remains useless outside the network of two. As the number of telephone users grows, the value
of the technology grows as well. Indeed, a telephone is most valuable when every person in the world has one (or several).161
Prima facie, industries that are characterized by network effects maximize their value when technological standards are
uniform. It is easy to see why. The adoption of a uniform standard potentially creates the greatest interoperability, and it
158 See Ran Abramitzky, The Limits of Equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz,
123 Q J Econ 1111, 1151 (2008) (“This paper suggests . . . that lock-in devices are required to make exit costly.”).
159 See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 94 (cited in note 11) (defining markets
exhibiting “network effects” as ones where “the value of membership to one user is positively affected when another user joins and enlarges the network”).
160 See id (describing the telecommunications market as a classic example of a market exhibiting “network effects”).
161 See id.
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therefore maximizes value for users. Consequently, over time
industries that display network effects often tend to converge on
a single standard.162 Obviously, standardization comes at a cost.
Standardization may thwart competition and stifle dynamic efficiency.163 The converged-upon standard may not be the best
technology. A technology’s initial market advantage (due to superior advertising, for instance) may be enough to compensate
for its technological inferiority.164 The adoption of a single proprietary technology creates a barrier to entry for other firms and
may yield a monopoly position for the standard’s provider.165
A commonly cited example is the technological standard
created in the 1990s personal computer market by IBM and Microsoft.166 When IBM entered the PC market in 1981, it was one
of several personal computer manufacturers, along with Apple,
Commodore, Atari, and Tandy.167 Each of the personal computers used different software for its operating system; IBM adopted Microsoft’s MS-DOS for its machines.168 As the IBM PC
standard became more popular, Microsoft’s operating systems
(MS-DOS and successor operating systems) became increasingly
important, until they eventually became the dominant operating
162 See id at 105 (“In markets with network effects, there is natural tendency toward
de facto standardization, which means everyone using the same system.”).
163 Consider Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 105–08 (cited in note 11) (noting
that while network effects tend to favor standardization, product differentiation and consumer heterogeneity may result in multiple products coexisting in a market exhibiting
network effects).
164 See id at 107 (observing that a “small, initial advantage” by a competitor in a
market with network effects may be enough “to parlay its advantage into a larger, lasting one”); Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 122 (cited in note 10).
165 See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 108 (cited in note 11) (stating that some
models demonstrate that “users tend to stick with an established technology even when
total surplus would be greater were they to adopt a new but incompatible technology”);
Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 122 (cited in note 10) (explaining that because
markets exhibiting network effects display inertia, “it is difficult for it to be displaced
even by a technically superior and cheaper alternative”).
166 See John E. Lopatka and William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft
and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 S Ct Econ Rev 157, 188 (1999); Gregory J.
Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69
Antitrust L J 87, 88 (2001); Richard J. Gilbert and Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s
Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, 15 J Econ Persp 25, 28–29 (Spring 2001).
167 See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not Only Microsoft: The Maturing of the Personal
Computer Software Industry, 1982–1995, 75 Bus Hist Rev 103, 110–13 (2001).
168 Id at 112–14. Although IBM machines were eventually sold with non-Microsoft
operating systems, the needs of software compatibility through several generations of
hardware dictated that IBM systems and those with similar and compatible hardware
architecture (IBM-compatibles) continue to use Microsoft software, through several generations of MS-DOS and later Microsoft Windows. See id at 127–28.
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systems for personal computers. Consequently, it became more
profitable for software companies to tailor their software (such
as games, word processors, etc.) for Microsoft’s operating systems.169 This, in turn, made Microsoft’s operating systems more
valuable to consumers, and increased Microsoft’s share of the
operating system market. The more popular the operating system, the more software it gathered, and the more software it
gathered, the more popular the operating system became.170
The economic and legal literature on the subject suggests
two possible solutions to the problem of monopolization: open
standards171 and interoperability.172 Essentially, both solutions
are the same. The core idea is to preserve the network effects
without sacrificing competition. The first solution advocates
forcing the adoption of standards that will remain open to all industry participants, so that each of them will be able to compete
over complementary technologies.173 The second solution does
not require technological standards to be completely open and
settles instead for requiring a design that will enable different
technological standards to interact with each other.174 A wellknown example is the market for cellular communications. In
this market, there are several service providers who operate

169

See Werden, 69 Antitrust L J at 93–94 (cited in note 166).
Steven D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP ‘Interface’: An Introductory Note,
in Steven D. Anderman, ed, The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy 1, 11 (Cambridge 2007). It must be noted that all this occurred while several competing operating systems—such as Apple’s Mac-OS, Next’s NeXTSTEP OS, and
IBM’s OS/2—were judged by industry experts to be technologically superior. See Besen
and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 118 (cited in note 10) (“[T]he initial success of MS-DOS is
usually attributed not to any technical superiority, but to the fact that it was supported
by IBM.”); John Sheesley, 5 of the Best Desktop Operating Systems You Never Used, TechRepublic (Mar 19, 2008), online at http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/classic-tech/5-of-the-best
-desktop-operating-systems-you-never-used/107 (visited May 9, 2013).
171 See, for example, Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 103 (cited in note 11) (describing, as an example of an “open” system, IBM’s decision to allow independent software developers to write IBM-compatible software for the PC).
172 See, for example, Lemley and McGowan, 86 Cal L Rev at 516 (cited in note 10):
170

One possible solution to the standardization problem is to make the competing
standards interoperable. If people can switch back and forth between competing versions of what is essentially the same standard, perhaps society can capture the benefits of competition without wasteful duplication of effort and
without stranding consumers who make the wrong choice.
173 See, for example, id at 486–87 (“[C]ertain market conditions, such as a credible
market commitment to open standards and compatibility, may ameliorate otherwise
negative consequences of network effects.”).
174 See id at 552.
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different technologies, yet the end users of all providers can
seamlessly communicate with each other.
Laws are a code of human behavior that can act like codes of
technological standards. The economic and social imperatives for
law, therefore, are often the same.175 However, there are some
important differences. As far as formal law is concerned, the
state has monopoly power over the production of the code, especially in the field of property where the numerus clausus principle grants to the state exclusive power over the recognition of
property rights.176 But the state cannot prevent private parties
from creating their own private codes of conduct, and the numerus clausus principle does not and cannot bar the creation of
informal localized property regimes. Indeed, by using contract
law, private parties can create legally enforceable localized
property regimes that closely resemble property law.177
Nonetheless, the network effects of legal standards yield
very strong pressure toward standardization. State recognized
property rights are rights in rem that avail against all persons
under the state’s authority.178 Hence, formal property rights are
akin to a technological standard that has been adopted by the
entire population of the jurisdiction. Owners of state-recognized
property rights can transact with relative ease with any other
person in the jurisdiction. Similarly, they can call on the state’s
protection of their rights against transgressions by others in the
jurisdiction. Localized property rights, by contrast, avail only
against the members of the group that recognizes them. In the
extreme, the number of members can be one. Similar to a single
telephone user, a single adopter of a property arrangement will
receive no value from the unique property form she devised. Indeed, it is meaningless to speak of a right that nobody else
175

See Posner, Law and Social Norms at 148–66.
See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 3–4 (cited in note 141) (explaining that
the number of property rights are fixed in both common law and civil law property systems).
177 See, for example, id at 5:
176

A willing buyer and a willing seller can create an infinite variety of enforceable
contracts for the exchange of recognized property rights, and can describe these
property rights along a multitude of physical dimensions and prices. But commonlaw courts will not enforce an agreement to create a new type of property right.
See also id at 54–58 (considering and rejecting the argument that numerus clausus is
irrelevant in today’s world where parties can contract in numerous ways to create “new
forms of organizational ownership based on contract”).
178 Merrill and Smith, 101 Colum L Rev at 777 (cited in note 18) (“Property rights,
on the other hand, are in rem—they bind ‘the rest of the world.’”).
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recognizes and that avails against no one. As the number of
community members increases, the potential value of their localized property arrangements increases as well. However, unless a
localized arrangement is formally endorsed by the state, it will
never encompass the entire population.
More generally, formal recognition of rights that is backed
by state enforcement dramatically increases the value of the
rights to their holders.179 Formally recognized rights are very
similar to an official currency. The state imprimatur renders
those rights more transferable (and consequently valuable) both
by increasing the number of potential transferees and by reducing the transaction costs associated with their passage.180 But
the advantages do not end there. The protection the state provides to formally recognized rights reduces protection costs for
owners and, according to conventional wisdom, gives them an
incentive to invest optimally in the development of their assets.
De Soto estimated that in Peru alone the cost of localized property arrangements that have not been recognized by the state
adds up to the staggering amount of $74 billion in what he calls
“dead capital.”181 Even though this figure is subject to debate,182
there is no doubt that formal recognition of property rights
yields substantial advantages. As de Soto observes, once property rights are formally recognized by the state, they can be “capitalized.” They can be used as security for debt, increasing liquidity. They can be more easily sold on the market, again
increasing liquidity.183

179 Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 26–34 (cited in note 141) (explaining that
formally recognized rights are more valuable because they do not bear the measurement
costs of rights that are not state recognized, such as informing parties of the rights resulting from such property regimes).
180 See, for example, Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks
of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 764–65 (1995) (arguing that corporate law should be analyzed in terms of network externalities). But see Hansmann, 8 Am L & Econ Rev at 6–7
(cited in note 12) (considering and rejecting the idea that corporate charter drafters rely
upon Delaware default corporate law rules due to network efficiencies).
181 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 33 (cited in note 149) (“The value of extralegally held rural and urban real estate in Peru amounts to some $74 billion.”).
182 See Christopher Woodruff, Book Review, Review of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, 39 J Econ Lit 1215, 1220–22 (2001); Jim Thomas, Book Review, Hernando de Soto,
The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere
Else, 34 J Latin Am Stud 189, 189–90 (2002); Kevin E. Davis, Book Review, The Rules of
Capitalism, 22 Third World Q 675, 678 (2001).
183 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 49–51 (cited in note 149) (“Legal property thus
gave the West the tools to produce surplus value over and above its physical assets.”).
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None of these advantages accrue to holders of localized
property rights.
C.

Translation and the State System of Property

The state is under no obligation to accommodate localized
property forms. Naturally, the state can voluntarily decide to
design its property code in a way that will be friendly and welcoming to localized property arrangements. But there is no way
to force it to do so. In short, the law is not an open standard; nor
is there a way to force the state to make it “interoperable” with
localized property regimes. The burden of achieving legal interoperability lies squarely with the local communities or groups
that opt out of the formal legal system and prefer to design their
unique property arrangements.
As we have seen, in some cases localized property systems
are “official” and enjoy or rely on the state’s imprimatur.184 In
other cases, the local property systems are “unofficial” and are
unrecognized by or even in opposition to state law.185
Where localized property systems are unofficial, translation
costs will generally be significant. But even where state law recognizes localized property systems, translation costs may arise.
The localized system, by virtue of its internal set of rules, does
not automatically translate into alienable rights within the larger system. Indeed, in some cases, the state imposes restrictions
on alienability as part of its recognition of the local system. Such
is the case, for instance, with respect to Sámi property rights.186
All things being equal, state recognition should lower translation costs. Well-designed state incorporation of localized property systems should not only lower the costs of informing outsiders about the nature of the localized rights, it should also lower
the costs of enforcing such rights. However, state recognition
may also have an adverse impact. Badly designed state incorporation (as was the case with Native American rights) can increase the incompatibility between localized and state systems
without bringing offsetting benefits in enforceability or information.187 Additionally, state recognition may ossify the localized
system, stripping away its ability to respond to community

184
185
186
187



See Part I.A.
See Part I.B.
See text accompanying notes 102–06.
See text accompanying notes 32–54.
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needs.188 This can lead to lower utility from the localized system
over time.
The dynamics leading to the state to recognize only some localized property systems are complex.
Some of the localized arrangements are essentially compatible with the general legal framework while others are not. As we
have noted, the degree to which localized property rights are incompatible with those of the state constitutes one of the central
costs of translation.189 These incompatibility costs are systemic
as well as rights centered. The more a localized property right is
incompatible with state rights, the greater will be the cost of
translating it to the outside world. What is true of the individual
right will also be true of the entire property system. The more
incompatible a particular localized regime, the less likely it is to
be recognized by the legal system. When the legal system refuses to recognize a particular localized arrangement, it means that
the value of the arrangement is confined to the group and efforts
to enforce the arrangement outside the group will be costly and
often fail.
Our analysis gives rise to an important implication. The attitude of the legal system is an important determinant of a localized property regime’s sustainability or viability. As we noted,
the state is free to determine its attitude towards localized property regimes. It can adopt a welcoming attitude or a hostile attitude. In this sense, the state is similarly situated to the proprietor of a dominant technological standard who has to decide how
to approach an alternative technological solution.
A caveat is in order here. Our analysis does not imply that
localized property regimes are necessarily inefficient for the
groups or communities that adopt them, even where the entire
regime is incompatible with the state property system.190 As we
will explore in greater detail in the next Part,191 the benefits, including ideological rents, that group members derive from

188

See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 884–86, 897–98 (cited in note 144).
See text accompanying notes 153–54.
190 Indeed, there is a debate in the literature about the optimal level at which property law should be produced. In a recent article, Professor Christopher Serkin advanced
a qualified argument for determining property protection at the local level (that is, by
local government) as opposed to the state or national level. See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev
at 892–904 (cited in note 144). It should be noted that Professor Serkin’s analysis focuses
primarily on takings and land use issues. In other words, it is concerned with protecting
property against government transgressions.
191 See Part III.
189
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unique property arrangements may outweigh the cost. Localized
property norms contribute to group cohesion and may be essential for the preservation of historical heritage.192 Hence from the
internal point of view of the group members, opting out of the
legal standard may be a prudent choice.
At the same time, it must be borne in mind that neither the
cost of localized property regimes nor the benefits remain constant over time. The calculus is dynamic. Market value of resources may change, making exit options more or less valuable.
Membership of the group within the localized property system
will doubtless change over time, leading to changed preferences.
As the preferences drift, it is likely that translation costs will increase over time, making convergence relatively more attractive.
D. Other Known Problems of Translation
In stating that localized property systems are subject to
translation costs, we do not intend to imply that only localized
property systems are subject to such costs. In fact, translation
problems can arise in other contexts, and, to some degree, problems of translation have previously been recognized in the literature, albeit only in several discrete contexts.193
Most obviously, property claims that cross state lines provide a familiar example of property translation problems. These
translation issues arise where people seek to enforce property
rights established and recognized by one jurisdiction in another.
Translation issues in such instances are subsumed into the larger set of problems associated with the field of conflict of laws.
Courts tackle translation problems by using conflict of laws
192 See, for example, Svensson, The Attainment of Limited Self-Determination at 271
(cited in note 97).
193 Perhaps the most exotic context is “virtual” property. Virtual property rights are
“property rights” owned by an imaginary character that exists in a game world. See, for
example, Fairfield, 85 BU L Rev at 1058–64 (cited in note 8) (discussing property in “virtual environments”). Because game worlds are quite extensive, involving hundreds of
thousands of players, and players are themselves sufficiently entertained to invest billions (in the aggregate) in the games, virtual property rights can prove quite valuable. In
2010, Jon Jacobs sold a virtual game “resort” in the Entropia Universe in a series of
transactions for a total of $635,000. Oliver Chiang, Meet the Man Who Just Made a Half
Million from the Sale of Virtual Property, Forbes (Nov 13, 2010), online at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverchiang/2010/11/13/meet-the-man-who-just-made-a-cool
-half-million-from-the-sale-of-virtual-property (visited May 9, 2013). Obviously, translating virtual property rights into the real world poses significant challenges. See John William Nelson, The Virtual Property Problem: What Property Rights in Virtual Resources
Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and Why They Are a Bad Idea, 41 McGeorge L
Rev 281, 307–08 (2010).
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principles to determine which legal system’s substantive rules
ought to apply. A particularly striking instance of such efforts
can be found in state law treatment of community property.
Community property is a form of joint ownership of property
that applies to certain kinds of spousal property acquired during
marriage.194 Only a handful of states today recognize community
property; other states restrict spouses to the forms of common
ownership recognized in the common law.195 Courts must therefore use conflict of law principles to resolve disputes where, for
example, a couple creates community property while domiciled
in a community property jurisdiction, and the couple subsequently establishes its domicile in a non-community-property
state.196 In earlier writings, we have participated in the scholarly
debate about whether property rights should be more generally
made available for migration.197
Even without crossing state lines, ordinary property rights
can give rise to translation issues. Various ordinary forms of
property—cotenancies, leaseholds, etc.—involve two-tiered property rights, in which one set of rules applies within the circle of
owners (among cotenants, for example), while another set of
rules applies outwards to the rest of the world. Internal arrangements among co-owners must be translated to the outside
world, and are subject to the obvious costs of education, incompatibility, and enforcement.

194 See ALI, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations 22 (Matthew Bender 2002) (“Community-property law begins with the contrary
presumption: all earnings from spousal labor during the marriage are the property of the
marital ‘community’ in which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest.”).
195 See id (stating that since there are only eight traditional community-property
states and, of these, five instruct courts to divide property “equitably,” equitable distribution is the “dominant rule” in the United States today).
196 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 259 (1971). Comment (a) to § 259
adds, “Considerations of fairness and convenience require that the spouses’ marital
property interests . . . are not affected by a change of domicil to another state by one or
both of the spouses.” Comment (b) provides, “If one or both spouses sell the property in
their domicile and reinvest the proceeds in another asset, the new asset purchased with
the proceeds retains the character of the original.” This is a departure from the usual
conflict of laws rules applying to property, under which the situs of the object or the domicile of the party establishes the relevant legal regime to apply. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 258(1).
197 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale
L J 72, 80 (2005).
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III. WHY LOCALIZED PROPERTY DOES NOT ALWAYS CONVERGE
Similar to the trend in technological settings, in the world of
property, too, there exists constant pressure on localized property regimes to conform to the dominant standard, namely, the
formal legal system. The pressure toward convergence is a direct
result of the translation problem. As we have explained, holders
of localized property rights must incur translation costs when
interacting with members of the public at large.198 The costs of
translation therefore reduce the utility of localized property
rights. Consequently, all things being equal, translation costs
should drive larger state systems to incorporate and supplant
localized property rights.
As long as the benefit they derive from having specialized
local property arrangements is greater than the cost associated
with translation, participants in the localized property system
will choose to preserve the localized regime. However, as their
losses mount due to increased translation costs, so will the pressure toward convergence—at least in most cases. As we will
show, the two central variables—the benefits from localized
property arrangements and translation costs—change over time.
Hence, the analysis must be dynamic.
One variable that affects the likelihood of convergence is the
cost of transitioning from the localized property system to the
larger state one. Even if members of the group respecting the localized property rights believe that the benefits of their localized
property rights no longer justify the payment of translation
costs, they may still hold on to their localized system.
The reason for this is obvious. Transitioning to the state
property system is potentially costly. If the state does not grant
formal recognition or adequate tools for translating the localized
property rights into state-recognized legal rights, property owners will find themselves permanently subject to the losses of imperfect translation. If the state does incorporate the localized
property rights, this will not necessarily result in convergence or
reduce the translation costs to zero. Politicians and potential
opponents may have to be persuaded to agree to the incorporation, and the very act of incorporation may harm some of the
beneficial qualities of the localized property system. Some members of society, both inside and outside the group, may feel that
there is a benefit to maintaining the separate localized property
198
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system alongside the regular state system. In some cases, the
political result may be a formalized state recognition of the localized property system, granting the rights state enforcement
without full incorporation or interoperability of the rights. This,
for instance, is the way the United States has traditionally dealt
with some aspects of Native American property rights.199 But in
other cases, no such complete formalization will be possible. Indeed, in some cases, the very incompatibilities between the localized property rights and state property rights that raise translation costs also raise transition costs. In such cases, the price of
convergence for participants in the localized property system
may be substantial amounts of wealth stored in localized property
rights that cannot be transitioned to the state property system.
In this Part, we examine some of the likely barriers to convergence of localized and state property systems. In particular,
we note the potential influence of the political process.200 Importantly, we do not judge political outcomes against convergence as necessarily bad or necessarily good. Sometimes the outcomes will reflect the optimal result; other times, they will not.
In any event, given this background, we show that we should
expect to continue seeing partially incompatible property systems despite translation costs.
A.

Community Preferences

Localized property regimes often reflect community preferences. Community preferences may reflect a shared ideology, or
culture, or simply a common interest of the group. When community preferences diverge sufficiently from those anchored in
the state property system, community members can derive a
benefit from opting out of the formal property system and adopting their own rules. Therefore, localized property regimes are
especially resistant to convergence when they embody community preferences that diverge from the norm, and such regimes
may survive even in the face of increasing economic pressures to
conform.
Assume, for example, that a localized property regime is
consistent with a certain ideology that is shared by all group
members. An example of this is the property system used in ear-

199 See Lilias Jones Jarding, Tribal-State Relations Involving Land and Resources in
the Self-Determination Era, 57 Polit Rsrch Q 295, 296 (2004).
200 See Part III.C.

2013]

Property Lost in Translation

559

ly kibbutzim, based on the members’ shared commitment to
communism as they understood it.201 In such cases, high costs of
translation may not be sufficient to drive group members to
adopt the state property system. The ideological benefits of separation from the state may be so high as to justify paying the
high translation costs. Kibbutz members may so enjoy their
communist ideological purity that they are more than willing to
pay the price of losing the ability to utilize their localized property rights in the surrounding society.
Indeed, in some cases, members may view the translation
costs as a valuable commitment mechanism. New members entering the kibbutz understand that the rights they will receive
as members—for instance, the right to live in a particular
house—will not generally be translatable into the wider society.
Because the rights received by the member can only be fully utilized within the kibbutz, members lock themselves into high
costs for economic transactions outside the community. These
costs can serve as a penalty for defecting from community values
and, therefore, as an important precommitment mechanism for
members of the community.202
Importantly, community preferences do not remain constant
over time. They may change as a result of the entry or exit of
new members with different preferences or because the original
members changed the preferences they once had. External
changes often serve as a catalyst in this process. Consider the
effect of market prices on ideology (or culture), for example.203
Even if the internal benefits of the local property remain stable,
opportunity costs for the local property system may grow as
greater gains can be realized in the outside, statewide property
system. Up to a certain point, the members of a community with
localized property norms may adhere to their original preferences. At a certain point the opportunity cost will become so
large that it will overcome the ideological counterweight. At this
point, the process of convergence will start and simultaneously
the countervailing ideology will begin to erode.

201 See David Barkin and John W. Bennett, Kibbutz and Colony: Collective Economies and the Outside World, 14 Comp Stud Socy & Hist 456, 460–61 (1972) (describing
the kibbutz as a “living version of the socialist communitarian ideal”). See also Spiro, 106
Am Anthro at 557 (cited in note 59).
202 See note 158 and accompanying text.
203 See Russell, Utopia in Zion at 169–70 (cited in note 72).
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Once community preferences change, the translation costs
that penalize defection can no longer effectively serve as a
means for binding together the community. On the contrary, the
changed preferences lead the community as a whole to change
the form of localized property rights so that the community as a
whole will no longer have to pay such high translation costs.
This is precisely what happened in the kibbutzim in Israel.
The kibbutzim were founded on a collectivist ideology that
shunned private property. For decades, members were not allowed to have any private property rights; all resources were
held by the collective.204 Over time, however, as the Israeli economy developed and younger members of kibbutzim realized that
they could get significant returns on their labor if they left the
kibbutz and offered services on the open market, they begin to
leave kibbutzim en masse. This factor was one of the chief causes of the financial collapse of kibbutzim in the 1980s.205 In response, an increasing number of kibbutzim relaxed the ban on
private property and started recognizing private property rights
in members. Today, private property rights are the norm in most
kibbutzim. Only a small group of well-to-do kibbutzim still abide
by the old property regime.206
Notwithstanding the experience of the kibbutzim in Israel,
in some instances community preferences may thwart convergence for long time periods. Even in Israel, it took decades until
the forces of the market overcame the strong ideological commitment of kibbutz members to ban private property. Accordingly, community preferences are an important mitigating force
against convergence.
B.

Transition Costs

A second barrier to convergence is transition costs. Localized property regimes sometimes arise out of necessity or path
dependence. In such cases, they are not optimal even from the
vantage point of the actors that abide by them. The informal
property rights of favela residents provide a useful example. One
can reasonably assume that the residents would be more than
happy to have their rights formalized. Yet, it does not happen.

204

See Abramitzky, 25 J Econ Persp at 192 (cited in note 60).
See id at 191–92.
206 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 560–61 (cited in note 59); Abramitzky, 123 Q J Econ
at 1132–40 (cited in note 158).
205
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As is the case with any equilibrium, even an inefficient one,207 it
is necessary to invest resources to effect a move to a more efficient state of affairs.
In this sense, our analysis parallels Professor Harold Demsetz’s famous account of the transition of property regimes from
open access to private property.208 Professor Demsetz pointed out
that even when the transition to private property rights is efficient, it might nevertheless not occur on account of high transition costs. Formalizing property rights is costly. The introduction of property rights in new resources requires asset definition,
recognition of rights in them, registration of the newly established rights, and then enforcement of the rights.209 The aggregate
cost of these tasks may outweigh the gains from privatization.
The same can happen with respect to localized property
rights. Informal property rights are prevalent in many countries
in Latin America. The favelas of Rio de Janeiro represent a
much broader phenomenon. Many economists, foremost among
them de Soto, believe that there are enormous gains to be had
from formalizing those rights.210 Currently, the informal rights
cannot serve as collateral for securing financing. This, in turn,
stunts economic growth. Formalizing those rights requires
adopting expensive land reforms. Among other things, the state
will have to clear away prior formalized titles to many of the real estate assets that have been claimed under the localized
property systems. In other cases, the state will have to provide a
formal mechanism for recognizing transfers that already took
place in violation of the formal rules.211

207 One example of an enduring, yet inefficient, equilibrium—according to Professors
Gary Libecap and Ronald Johnson—is the practice of grazing on Navajo land. See Gary
D. Libecap and Ronald N. Johnson, Legislating Commons: The Navajo Tribal Council
and the Navajo Range, 18 Econ Inq 169, 79–84 (1980).
208 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 350–
53 (1967).
209 See Stuart Banner, Transitions between Property Regimes, 31 J Legal Stud S359,
S361–65 (2002).
210 See de Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 49 (cited in note 149). See also Michael J.
Trebilcock and Mariana Mota Prado, What Makes Poor Countries Poor? Institutional Determinants of Development 95–97 (Edward Elgar 2011); David de Ferranti, et al, Beyond
the City: The Rural Contribution to Development 181 (World Bank 2005); Doing Business
in 2006: Creating Jobs 31–32 (World Bank 2006).
211 See Michael Trebilcock and Paul-Erik Veel, Property Rights and Development:
The Contingent Case for Formalization, 30 U Pa J Intl L 397, 443–52 (2008).
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Some countries, like Peru, decided to bite the bullet and enact the necessary enabling legislation despite the price tag.212
Other Latin American countries have refrained from taking this
step. There are two possible explanations for the decision not to
formalize localized property rights. First, the cost of passing the
reform may be thought to exceed the projected benefit. Second,
the reform may be blocked for political reasons. The difference
between the two explanations is that in the former case, converging the localized property system with the state system is
welfare reducing, while in the latter case, the change might be
welfare enhancing yet is not effected on account of narrow political considerations or because it is not high enough on the politicians’ priority list. We discuss these possibilities at greater
length in the next Section.
C.

Political Motivations

A third force that sometimes countervails the pressure toward convergence is political interests. As Professor Saul
Levmore pointed out, the political processes—or more precisely,
politicians—often thwart efficient changes in the world of property.213 Changes in property regimes, he reminded us, are a
product of the political process. Politicians, as self-interest maximizing agents, would often choose to block welfare-enhancing
transitions when doing so can help them politically.214
As an illustration consider the case of the kibbutzim in Israel. Traditionally, the kibbutzim constituted the base of the Labor
Party, which ruled Israel in the first few decades of its existence.
It was clearly in the best interest of the Labor Party to do anything in its power to act in tandem with the leaders of the kibbutzim in order to preserve the dominant socialist ideology as
well as the leadership. These narrow political interests enabled
the kibbutzim to extract various political concessions and, more

212 See Erica Field, Entitled to Work: Urban Property Rights and Labor Supply in
Peru, 122 Q J Econ 1561, 1564–65 (2007); Erica Field, Property Rights and Investment in
Urban Slums, 3 J Eur Econ Assn 279, 281 (2005); David F. Varela and Jorge L. Archimbaud, Property Rights and Land Tenancy, in Marcelo M. Giugale, Vicente FretesCibils, and John L. Newman, eds, An Opportunity for a Different Peru: Prosperous, Equitable, and Governable 553, 559–63 (World Bank 2006).
213 Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J Legal
Stud S421, S425–29 (2002).
214 Id at S426–27.
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importantly for our purposes, stave off the economic pressures
that ultimately forced privatization on many kibbutzim.215
The story of the Sámi in Norway (and other Scandinavian
countries) is in many respects different from that of the kibbutzim in Israel, but it, too, highlights the significance of political
considerations as an anticonvergence force. In order to preserve
their traditional lifestyle, the Sámi and their reindeer herds
need to cross over broad expanses of land.216 The migrating ways
of the Sámi present a challenge to the Norwegian property system. Yet, for cultural and ideological reasons, the political system in Norway (as well as a big part of the population) is strongly predisposed to protect the Sámi lifestyle, notwithstanding its
cost.217
One need not venture to far-off places to appreciate the effect of political motivations on localized property regimes. Localized property rights in parking spots in the United States provide a fascinating example of the interaction between localized
property arrangements and local politics. In his study of property rights in parking spaces, Professor Epstein reports of the existence of a localized property norm in Chicago under which a
person who cleared the snow off of a parking spot is entitled to it
until the street is cleared of ice and snow by the municipality.218
Urban activists opposed the practice for being unfair and inefficient, but it was staunchly defended by Mayor Richard M. Daley, who said: “I tell people, if someone spends all that time digging their car out, do not drive in that spot. This is Chicago. Fair
warning.”219 Clearly, local politicians are strongly disincentivized
to overturn the norm for fear of the political price of doing so.220

215 See Eli Avraham, Behind Media Marginality: Coverage of Social Groups and
Places in the Israeli Press 72–73 (Lexington 2003); Marsha Drezon-Tepler, Interest
Groups and Political Change in Israel 157–60 (SUNY 1990).
216 See Scott M. Williams, Tradition and Change in the Sub-Arctic: Sámi Reindeer
Herding in the Modern Era, 75 Scandinavian Stud 229, 237 (2003).
217 See Eva Josefsen, The Sami and the National Parliaments: Direct and Indirect
Channels of Influence, in Kathrin Wessendorf, ed, Challenging Politics: Indigenous Peoples’ Experiences with Political Parties and Elections 64, 75–77 (International Work
Group for Indigenous Affairs 2001).
218 Epstein, 31 J Legal Stud at S528–29 (cited in note 21).
219 Id at S529, quoting Mark Brown, Time to Jettison Chicago’s Space Junk, Chi
Sun-Times A1 (Jan 11, 2001).
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Professor Mancur Olson has noted the ability of small, organized groups with a discrete interest in a goal that is very
valuable to them to capture the political process.221 Such groups,
on account of their superior organization, can prevail in the political arena over much larger yet disorganized groups and extract benefits at their expense.222 Communities and groups with
localized property regimes often fit Professor Olson’s description
of small, organized groups.223 Consequently, they—or more precisely, their leaders—can extract sufficient concessions from the
political system to enable them to preserve localized property
arrangements.
Political opposition to transition can therefore arise in a variety of circumstances. Politicians may oppose transition because they view the localized property systems as sufficiently
important or valuable to the society at large to warrant the continued payment of translation costs. Alternatively, politicians
may oppose transition because the systems are sufficiently valuable to a particularly powerful group that the political losses entailed in convergence are greater than the political gains, even
though convergence might be advantageous to society as a
whole.
IV. TRANSLATION AND PROPERTY, GENERALLY
Thus far, we have examined the popularity of localized
property systems, described the translation costs they create
when interacting with the statewide property system, and examined the reasons why localized property systems may resist incorporation and replacement by the state property system. We
now turn to several broader issues of property theory illuminated by the phenomenon of localized property systems.
A.

Commons

Very few topics in property theory have attracted as much
attention as the choice between private property and commons
property.224 The opening salvo in the ongoing debate between the
221 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 53 (Harvard 1965).
222 Id at 22–35.
223 Id at 48–50.
224 For some important contributions to the literature, see Carol Rose, The Comedy
of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U Chi L Rev
711, 711–23 (1986); Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights 1–9 (Cambridge
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champions of private property and the proponents of commons
property can be traced back to Professor Demsetz’s seminal Toward a Theory of Property, in which he laid out a prima facie
case for the superiority of private property regimes, at least from
the perspective of efficiency.225 In a nutshell, Professor Demsetz
argued that formalizing private property rights in resources
eliminates a severe problem of negative externalities inimical to
commons property. He showed that when a resource is held in
common, actors have a tendency to overuse it since each of them
derives the full marginal benefit of her use while paying only a
small fraction of the marginal cost.226 This insight has commonly
been associated with Professor Garrett Hardin’s gloomy prediction that “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”227
Subsequent contributions, among them the path-breaking
work of Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, have challenged Professor Demsetz’s conclusion.228 Professor Ostrom, for one, has
demonstrated that close-knit groups can come up with governance rules that can reduce the externalities problem to a manageable level and solve the overuse problem.229 Others, foremost
among them Professor Michael Heller, pointed out that the proliferation of private property rights in resources may lead to serious holdout problems, which result in underutilization of resources.230 Professor Heller, following a lead from Professor Frank
Michelman,231 labeled the latter phenomenon “anticommons.”232
In this Section, we highlight a different, hitherto overlooked
aspect of the debate concerning the choice between private property and commons property. Earlier discussions have focused on
the resource-by-resource transaction costs entailed in management through private property or commons. We look at the
1989); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J Legal Stud S453, S454–56 (2002); Louis De Alessi, Property Rights
and Privatization, 36 Proceedings Acad Polit Sci 24, 26–27 (1987).
225 Demsetz, 57 Am Econ Rev 347, 355–57 (cited in note 208).
226 Id at 354.
227 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244 (1968).
228 See generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 1990).
229 Id at 15–18.
230 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv L Rev 621, 667–73 (1998); Michael Heller, The Gridlock
Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives
2 (Basic Books 2008).
231 Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, 39 Tulsa L Rev
663, 665 (2004).
232 Heller, 111 Harv L Rev at 624 (cited in note 230).
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potential transaction costs created by interactions with the
property systems. As we will show, including such costs in our
analysis dramatically changes the analysis of commons problems.
Debates to date have focused on the resource-by-resource
transaction costs entailed in management through private property or commons.233 On the one hand, scholars agree that, in
high transaction cost environments, users may be expected to
overconsume resources in the commons since users may partially
externalize the costs of their use of any given resource while internalizing the full benefits.234 Thus, for instance, users of a fishery held in the commons know that they can enjoy the full benefit of any fish caught while suffering only a small portion of the
costs of depleting the fishery. This phenomenon is commonly
known as the “tragedy of the commons,” thanks to Professor
Hardin’s famous article on the subject.235 On the other hand,
where the transaction costs of governing strategies are sufficiently low, close-knit communities may adopt governance rules
and monitoring mechanisms,236 as well as social sanctions,237 to
combat effectively the tendency of individual members to overuse a common resource. Thus, Professor Ostrom showed that
close-knit communities, such as Eskimos, have been able to craft
rules preventing the depletion of fisheries held in the commons.238
Resource-by-resource transaction costs are also responsible
for the expected underconsumption of resources held by an excessive number of private owners. In such anticommons—as
Professor Heller labels them—managing any given resource requires aggregating the consent of numerous private property
owners.239 Where transaction costs are too high, the vetoes cast
by one or more of the owners will be final, and the resource will
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remain unused to its best potential. Thus, Professor Heller cites,
among others, the example of private Native American property
rights in reservation land. In many cases, says Professor Heller,
fractional shares have descended through several generations,
creating a multiplicity of owners over the land, each with a tiny
share of ownership in the whole.240 This has led to a collection of
owners whose costs of coordination far exceed any reasonable
prospect of earning utility from the land. Professor Heller offers
the example of Tract 1305, valued at $8,000 but owned by 439
owners, thus requiring $17,560 per year to coordinate payments
of annual rent that aggregated to only $1,080 per year.241 The
result, says Professor Heller, is a form of property that cannot
possibly be cost-effectively managed, and is doomed to nonuse or
nonproductive use.242
Our contribution to this debate is in the observation that
transaction costs also come in the form of translation costs. At
core, our insight is very simple: once a given resource is managed by a regime separate from the legal standard in a certain
jurisdiction, it makes translating between the regime and the
wider legal standard increasingly cumbersome. Accordingly, in a
jurisdiction that generally recognizes private property as the
dominant regime for resource management, communities that
wish to adopt common property regimes for their own tight-knit
group will incur much greater costs. Correlatively, the greater
the deviation of the property regime from the default regime, the
costlier it will be for the members of the community adhering to it.
Our claim is based on the phenomenon of translation. Simply put, transaction-cost analyses not only must take account of
the costs of bargaining for optimal use of any given resource, but
they also must take into account the costs of bargaining across
different property systems.
Consider, for instance, Eskimo rights in a fishery. As Professor Ostrom observes, the internal rules of the Eskimo community may prevent overfishing and thereby avoid the tragedy
of the commons.243 However, the fact that the Eskimo rights are
internal to the community means they cannot easily be translated
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to outsiders. An Eskimo fisherman cannot trade rights in the
fishery with outsiders, or use the rights as security for a loan.
An interesting implication of our insight is that common resources may sometimes be subject to under-, rather than over-,
utilization. We submit that owing to translation costs, common
resources might be left underdeveloped because the rights holders will be unable to achieve general recognition for any private
rights they may obtain in objects they remove from the commons. Importantly, the translation costs associated with commons property cannot be lowered by the adoption of effective internal governance rules. Collective action mechanisms by closeknit communities may successfully block members’ overuse of
the common resource. However, these are intragroup measures
whose effect is confined to members of the group and their relationships with one another. Hence, Professor Ostrom’s research
offers no solution to the translation problem. In the situations
described by Professor Ostrom, group governance can prevent
overuse, but not underuse.
Another implication of our analysis is that some kinds of anticommons suffer even greater problems of underconsumption
than realized by Professor Heller. Professor Heller focused on
the likelihood of underconsumption where owners have high
costs in coordinating with one another.244 But if the anticommons arise within a localized property system, translation costs
must be added to the coordination costs as a barrier to efficient
use of the property. To return to the infamous Tract 1305 cited
by Professor Heller, even if a new and dramatically cheaper system of coordination were developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to permit managing the interests of the 439 owners, the
property would still be undervalued because the limitations of
transferability mean that any rights recognized by the Bureau
and landowners cannot be easily translated into the wider property systems of the United States.245
Both in the cases cited by Professor Ostrom and in those by
Professor Heller, the translation problem is largely external to
the group. It arises from the gap between the property settings
of the formal legal systems and the localized property rules
adopted by a certain group or community. The adoption of an effective governance mechanism does not remedy the translation
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problem and cannot remedy it. Our analysis suggests that irrespective of the governance mechanisms that apply to common
resources, the mechanisms will often give rise to translation
costs.
B.

Semicommons

Our translation analysis is also potentially relevant to a
branch of the commons literature that focuses on mixtures of
features of commons and private property called “semicommons.” The term semicommons is often attributed to Professor
Smith, and it refers to situations in which assets are managed
with a mixture of commons and private property rights.246 The
classic example cited by Professor Smith is the open fields system used in England in the Middle Ages. In the open fields system, peasants each privately owned delineated strips of land in
one or more large fields within the village boundaries. However,
alongside the peasants’ private rights in the land, there coexisted a commons regime under which the land would have to be
opened for grazing during specified times of the year.247
Professor Smith posited that semicommons would arise
where, in some places or for some uses, an asset could be most
profitably managed by protecting private exclusion rights and
leaving one person to be the gatekeeper for the asset, while at
different times or for different uses the asset would be optimally
managed through a governance regime, without a single gatekeeper.248 The advantage of semicommons over commons regimes could be found in the disciplining effects of partial private
property. The strategic offloading of costs onto other users that
characterizes commons regimes is less profitable in a welldesigned semicommons. At the same time, semicommons may
prove cheaper to set up and manage than a full private property
regime, and transaction costs among the semicommons owners
may prove lower, making semicommons preferable in certain
circumstances to full-scale private property.249
A translation analysis adds a dynamic dimension to Professor Smith’s analysis. Following the path of Professor Demsetz,
246
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Professor Smith imagines transitions between and among commons, semicommons, and private property regimes as the values
of the asset and various uses of it change, in contrast with the
transaction costs involved in managing the property and transitioning among regimes.250 We posit that one potentially hidden
cost in the analysis is the cost of translation of semicommons arrangements beyond the bounds of the community. Semicommons
arrangements could certainly encourage efficient use among
members of a community using an open field. However, because
those rights are partially bound to the ongoing governance arrangements with the community, there will necessarily be translation costs involved in moving to a different area, or in bringing
in outsiders. These translation costs can thus exacerbate the
standard costs involved in relocation and mobility. In medieval
England, translation costs could extract a hidden price from the
peasants twice: once by discouraging mobility and a second time
by making transitions more costly where localities would have to
translate old rights into new ones.
The advantages of semicommons are therefore tightly linked
to the pervasiveness of owner mobility and their potential desire
to translate their rights to outsiders. The more dynamic the society, the more costly semicommons regimes are, irrespective of
the internal costs of managing a semicommons and encouraging
optimal management and use.
C.

Property Formalities

A third field of scholarly inquiry for which our translation
analysis holds relevance is the field of inquiry pioneered by Peruvian economist de Soto. De Soto is best known for his work on
informal economies in the third world,251 and his thesis that an
informational framework is the necessary backbone for the full
enjoyment of property rights.252 For instance, de Soto writes that
owners of assets in “informal” (that is, not fully legal) economic
units like favelas enjoy property rights that cannot reach
their full potential because the owners cannot use their rights to
obtain credit. Unregistered and unrecognized rights cannot be
mortgaged and used to secure loans. Unregistered and unrecognized rights cannot easily be transferred to others. Unregistered
250

Smith, 29 J Legal Stud at 138–44 (cited in note 32).
See de Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 1–10 (cited in note 149); Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism 1–15 (Basic Books 1989).
252 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 52–54 (cited in note 149).
251

2013]

Property Lost in Translation

571

and unrecognized rights cannot easily be vindicated in courts
of law.253
Professor Jeffrey Stake summarized the costs of intransferability as they were pointed out in the economic literature:
Economic theory would predict that where rights cannot be
transferred, productivity will suffer. Omotunde, applying
the analysis of Coase, Alchian and Demsetz to land tenure,
argues that restrictions on the sale of land reduce investment in land by making it difficult to borrow for improvements and by limiting an owner’s ways of capturing his investment. He concludes that there must be freedom and lelegal enforcement of sale and rental contracts for a system
of land tenure to facilitate wealth increases.254
De Soto argues that formalizing property rights, and creating the informational framework for recognizing and vindicating
those rights, is the key to unlocking their potential to create
wealth. Once rights are properly registered, information about
the property rights is available to a much wider audience, and
the potential for realizing gains from the property is correspondingly greater.255
The relevance of de Soto’s work for our analysis of translation costs in localized property systems is obvious. Indeed, as we
see it, de Soto’s argument explores one central aspect of the wider phenomenon of localized property systems and their translation costs. As we argue, significant information costs can be created by localized property systems and their differences with
other property systems. However, these are not the only translation costs that must be considered. For instance, rights within
localized property systems may be partially incompatible with
state-recognized property rights. Thus, formalization of rights
might come at the cost of losing some of the attractiveness of
the structure of localized property rights. This is why, in some
cases, “formalization” of rights—or in our parlance, convergence
of localized property rights with the wider state property system—may be disadvantageous. In other cases, of course, “formalization” is highly desirable. De Soto’s work is an important
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contribution to the analysis of localized property systems, but it
is incomplete.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have explored the phenomenon of localized property systems and the interactions of such localized
property systems with property law. In our exploration, we have
looked both at the local systems themselves and at their implications for our broader understanding of the world of property.
We began by showing the ubiquity of localized property systems. Some appear quite exotic, such as the informal property
rights in favelas in Brazil, collective property rights in kibbutzim in Israel, or even virtual property rights in computer games.
Other localized property systems are quite mundane, such as
the quasi-property rights in urban parking spaces or the agreedupon property arrangements among roommates. In all events,
localized property systems serve some need of the localized
property users. The localized systems may be due to lower
transaction costs thanks to ongoing relationships (roommates),
ideological preferences (kibbutzim), flaws in property law or its
satellite regulatory systems (favelas), or a variety of other reasons. Whatever the reasons for the localized property systems,
they are not costless. All localized property systems entail translation costs with the wider state property systems around them.
Translation costs result from incompatibilities, as well as information and enforcement costs. Some of the localized systems are
adopted or recognized by state law; others are not. Systems that
earn state recognition may benefit from lower translation costs,
but they may only suffer from poor incorporation or from ossification. In any event, state recognition of localized systems does
not eliminate translation costs.
One way of understanding the phenomenon of localized
property systems is through the economic lens of network effects. The value of property arrangements increases as the number of people who abide by them goes up. The greater the number of adherents, the greater the utility of the property regime.
These network effects, and the translation costs generated by localized property systems, create pressure for localized property
systems to converge with the larger state property systems
around them. But pressures for convergence may be resisted.
Convergence is itself costly. The costs of transitioning may bar
convergence, or the continued utility of the localized property
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system may render convergence not cost-effective. Additionally,
politics may block efficacious convergences of property systems.
Our Article aims to provide the beginnings of an exploration
of localized property systems and translation problems rather
than a complete survey. We demonstrated that the insights
identified in this Article have important and divergent implications for the theoretical work on common property, the semicommons, and property formalities. Specifically, we showed that
the introduction of translation costs into the analysis calls into
question the positions endorsed by property theorists on common and semicommon property, as well as the formalization of
property rights in various resources. If our analysis is correct,
policymakers must pay close heed to the problem of translation
as they design future property systems.



